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RIGHTS MYOPIA IN CHILD WELFARE
Clare Huntington
For decades, legal scholars have debated the proper balance of parents'
rights and children's rights in the child welfare system. This Article argues that
the debate mistakenly privileges rights. Neither parents' rights nor children's
rights serve families well because, as implemented, a solely rights-based model of child
welfare does not protect the interests of parents or children. Additionally, even if
well-implemented, the model still would not serve parents or children because it
obscures the important role of poverty in child abuse and neglect and fosters
conflict, rather than collaboration, between the state and families. In lieu of a
solely rights-based model, this Article proposes a problem-solving model for child
welfare and explores one process born of such a model, family group
conferencing. This Article argues that a problem-solving model holds significant
potential to address many of the profound theoretical and practical shortcomings
of the current child welfare system.
IN TRO DU CT IO N ............................................................................................................. 638
I. THE RIGHTS-BASED MODEL OF CHILD WELFARE ................................................... 642
A . Parents' R igh ts ............................................................................................... 643
B . C h ildren's R ights ........................................................................................... 647
C . A lternatives and C om prom ises ...................................................................... 652
I. LIMITATIONS OF THE RIGHTS-BASED MODEL ......................................................... 655
A. The Failure of Rights as Implemented ........................................................... 656
B. The Conceptual Shortcomings of Rights ....................................................... 663
III. A PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL: THE EXAMPLE OF FAMILY
G ROUP C ONFERENCING ......................................................................................... 672
A. Origins, the Process, and Theoretical Underpinnings ................................... 674
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; J.D., Columbia Law
School; B.A., Oberlin College. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the 2005
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, and at the 12th World Conference of the
International Society of Family Law. For their insights and encouragement at various stages of
this project, I thank Annette Appell, Emily Buss, June Carbone, Jennifer Collins, Kristin Collins,
Nestor Davidson, Ariela Dubler, Maxine Eichner, Allison Eid, Ann Laquer Estin, Joanna
Grossman, Jill Hasday, Sarah Krakoff, Lisa Merkel-Holguin, Scott Peppet, William Pizzi, Carolyn
Ramsey, Colene Robinson, Russell Robinson, Pierre Schlag, Elizabeth Scott, Laura Spitz, Michael
Waggoner, Philip Weiser, Marianne Wesson, Robin West, Robin Fretwell Wilson, Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, and the participants in a faculty workshop at the University of Colorado
School of Law. I also thank Sania Anwar, Tricia Leakey, Catherine Madsen, Renee Neswadi,
Mitra Pemberton, Jennifer Sloan, Michelle Swardenski, and Cynthia Sweet for their research
assistance. Finally, I thank Michelle Comeau and the staff of the UCLA Law Review for their
exceptionally careful and thoughtful editing.
637
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 637 2005-2006
638 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 637 (2006)
B. Early Em pirical R esearch ................................................................................ 680
IV . BEYOND THE M YOPIA OF RIGHTS ........................................................................... 687
A . Benefits of the Problem-solving M odel .......................................................... 688
1. M ore Protection in Practice ................................................................... 689
2. A M ore Apt Theoretical Framework ...................................................... 691
B. O vercom ing the Inertia of Rights .................................................................. 696
C O N C LU SIO N ................................................................................................................. 699
INTRODUCTION
One of the central debates in family law focuses on the proper balance
between parents' rights and children's rights. Although this debate plays
out in numerous and varied contexts, including child custody,' religious
freedom,2 immigration proceedings,3 education,4 criminal law,5 and the par-
ticipation of the United States in international treaties,6 the debate is par-
ticularly vociferous and the stakes especially high in the context of the
child welfare system. In that context, the debate between advocates of par-
ents' rights and children's rights is charged and polarized. Elizabeth
Bartholet, for example, contends that a pervasive "blood bias" in the child
welfare system sacrifices children's futures.7 She alleges that the state is
overly deferential to parents' rights and far too unwilling to remove chil-
l. See, e.g., MARY ANN MASON, THE CUSTODY WARS: WHY CHILDREN ARE LOSING
THE LEGAL BATTLE, AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT 65-92 (1999) (arguing that the law
privileges parental rights, vis-A-vis children's rights, in custody determinations).
2. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994) (arguing for the complete dismantlement
of parents' rights, and instead using children's rights as the basis for protecting the interests of
children, recognizing only a child-rearing privilege in parents).
3. See, e.g., David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of Children's
Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979 (2002) (arguing that immigration law is
decidedly not child-centered and instead relies on outdated notions of children as property, wards of
the state, and mini-adults).
4. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Speaking Truth to Power: Challenging "The Power
of Parents to Control the Education of Their Own," 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481 (2002)
(arguing for children to have education rights apart from their parents, such as a voice in the
decision whether to home school or receive sex education).
5. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Collins, Crime and Parenthood: The Uneasy Case for Prosecuting
Negligent Parents, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (arguing for a child-centered view of
the prosecution of parents who negligently leave children in cars, resulting in death).
6. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, From Property to Personhood: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 5 GEo. J. FIGHTING POVERTY 313 (1998) (arguing that U.S.
opposition to the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child has its roots in the protection of
parents' rights, which in turn, has its roots in the view of children as property).
7. See ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER
DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999).
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dren from homes where they have been abused or neglected.' To Dorothy
Roberts, on the other hand, the state intervenes too readily, especially in
the lives of African American families. Roberts argues that the dispropor-
tionate number of African American children in the child welfare system
leads to African American families being "systematically demolished."9
To be sure, the debate between advocates of parents' rights and chil-
dren's rights is complex. Those who promote children's rights do not uni-
formly favor state intervention. For example, some scholars and advocates
contend that the unwarranted removal of a child from her biological parent
is as much a violation of the rights of the child as of the parent."0 In this
way, the debate could more accurately be described as one between family
preservationists (those who disfavor state intervention with a bias toward
removal) and child protectionists (those who favor aggressive state inter-
vention, even if it leads to removal).
Regardless of the frame, the debate misses the mark because it mistak-
enly privileges rights. As currently implemented, the rights-based model of
child welfare protects neither parent nor child in the typical case. To give
just three examples: First, despite parents' rights, there is substantial evi-
dence that official decisions are often driven by racial biases and political
expediency. Second, procedural safeguards and court adjudications that are
designed to protect rights often do not lead to careful, reliable decisions.
Third, state intervention to protect a child's right to be free from abuse and
neglect may be essential in some cases, but also comes at a high cost to the
child in the typical child welfare case.
Moreover, adding resources to the current system will not "fix" it because
this will not resolve the fundamental problems associated with a myopic
focus on rights within the child welfare system. The dominant conception of
rights assumes the rights bearer is an autonomous individual seeking
freedom from the state. Parents in the child welfare system need more than
autonomy. They need concrete assistance. Children also need assistance,
although most do not need state intervention in the form it is now
provided. Thus, rights obscure the role of poverty in abuse and neglect, and
relying on rights does not ensure poor parents will receive the help they
need. Additionally, rights will never be the primary way to produce good
results for families because the rights-based model creates, or at least
perpetuates, an adversarial process for decisionmaking. This adversarial
8. Id.
9. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE, at viii (2002).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 75-79.
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process impedes the thoughtful group collaboration among parents, chil-
dren, and the state that is essential to devising beneficial solutions.
Indeed, the adversarial system, which is a direct outgrowth of a focus
on rights, disserves the goals of both preservationists and protectionists.
Preservationists contend that a misconstrued articulation of children's
rights and de-emphasis of parents' rights results in too much intervention in
the home in the form of removal (or threatened removal). Child protec-
tionists claim that too much emphasis on parents' rights and a misconstrued
articulation of children's rights results in too little intervention in the
home. The reality is that the emphasis on rights has led to the wrong kind of
involvement in the lives of troubled families, resulting in over- and
underprotection of everyone's rights and a serious misallocation of resources.
In this way, rights have created a largely ineffective process for addressing
child abuse and neglect.
A new model, and a new process to implement that model, is needed.
In searching for this new model, I contend that the central question is not
where to draw the line between preservation and protection (the concern
that animates the debate over parents' rights and children's rights), but
rather how best to help families address the serious problems underlying
child abuse and neglect.
To this end, in lieu of a rights-based model, I argue that a problem-
solving model would better serve the goals of the child welfare system. In
this new model, the substantive goals of the child welfare system-to promote
family preservation and ensure the safety of children-would remain, but
the means for achieving these goals would be different. The new model
would focus on solving the problems underlying the abuse and neglect,
viewing such abuse and neglect largely as products of poverty, not parental
pathology. Additionally, the problem-solving model would generate a new
process that would foster collaboration between the state and families.
Thus, at heart this Article is about the relationship between legal
models and the processes that different models generate. To put it most
simply, a rights-based model leads to an adversarial process, whereas a
problem-solving model leads to a collaborative process. I argue the latter is
better suited to serving the interests of both parents and children.
Although a number of collaborative processes could satisfy the prob-
lem-solving model, in this Article I focus on one especially promising proc-
ess: family group conferencing. A form of restorative justice, family group
conferencing is a legal process for resolving child welfare cases without
relying on a family court judge as the decisionmaker. After a report of child
640 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 637 (2l')C16
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abuse or neglect has been substantiated, the state convenes a conference
with immediate and extended family members, and other important people
in the child's life, such as teachers or religious leaders, to decide how to pro-
tect the child and support the parents. At the conference, the family and
community members devise a plan for protecting the child and addressing
the issues that led to the abuse and neglect, such as substance abuse, lack of
housing, or inadequate child care. The participants of the family group
conference and the state then work together to provide necessary supports
to the family. By concentrating on the underlying problems, family group
conferencing both focuses on the root causes of abuse and neglect and also
fosters collaboration among parents, children, and the state.
I should note that I argue for the adoption of a problem-solving model
for all cases except the small minority of cases in the system that involve
severe abuse or neglect." In these cases, I contend that, at least as an initial
matter, the rights-based model should be preserved. For reasons discussed
below, it would appear that the adversarial process generated by the rights-
based model is better suited to address the interests of parents and children
in these cases. I do not, however, reach this conclusion as a definitive mat-
ter. 2 Rather, my point is that if we take this minority of cases off the table,
it is apparent that a different model-and a different process to implement
the model-is best suited to the majority of cases in the child welfare system.
Thus, this Article stakes a claim to a novel approach to the legal
framework governing the child welfare system. Instead of a myopic focus on
rights, this Article proposes shifting rights to the background (although not
out of the picture entirely) in favor of a holistic, problem-solving model.'3
11. See JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: How TO BREAK THE
CYCLE OF ABUSE AND NEGLECT 124 (1998) (noting that only about 10 percent of all child welfare
cases involve child abuse or neglect severe enough to warrant criminal justice intervention).
12. In New Zealand and elsewhere, family group conferencing is used for all cases,
including severe abuse and neglect. See MARK HARDIN ET AL., ABA CTR. ON CHILDREN & THE
LAW, FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES: LEARNING FROM
THE EXPERIENCES OF NEW ZEALAND 3, 76 (1996); Pat McElroy & Cynthia Goodsoe, Family
Group Decision Making Offers Alternative Approach to Child Welfare, YOUTH L. NEWS, May-June 1998,
at 3-4. This suitability issue deserves further study.
13. The move toward helping biological families function better, rather than simply removing
children and finding them alternative homes, is becoming quite widespread in the child welfare
world. See, e.g., Patricia Schene, The Emergence of Differential Response, PROTECTING CHILDREN:
DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE IN CHILD WELFARE (Am. Humane Ass'n, Denver, CO), 2005, at 4, 4-6
(discussing the "differential response" approach to child welfare, which takes a mcre collaborative
approach to working with low and moderate risk cases in the child welfare system; noting that the
field of child welfare increasingly recognizes the importance of working with biological families and
the hidden strengths in such families); see also infra text accompanying notes 199, 261 (describing
reforms in Alabama and New York City, which build on strengths of biological families). But the
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To advance this argument, the Article proceeds in four parts. Part I
describes the rights-based model of child welfare, examining parents' rights,
children's rights, and proposals that attempt to articulate a new approach
within the current rights-based system. Part II explores the limitations of
the rights-based model, concluding that parents' rights and children's rights,
as implemented and as conceived, do not produce effective solutions for
parents or children. Part III describes the problem-solving model and then
describes in detail one process that embodies this model, family group con-
ferencing. Part IV addresses how the new problem-solving model overcomes
the limitations of the rights-based model, and discusses, briefly, forces that
might impede the adoption of a problem-solving model.
I. THE RIGHTS-BASED MODEL OF CHILD WELFARE
The mission of the child welfare system is to protect children believed
to be abused or neglected by their families and to strengthen families where
children are at risk for abuse and neglect. 4 The state uses its parens patriae
authority to intervene in such families to offer "child protective services." 5
These intervention services range from support to keep a family together, to
removing a child from a biological family and placing the child in a foster
home or institution (sometimes leading to the termination of parental
rights and the adoption of the child). The system involves vast numbers of
children: The number of children in foster care has grown dramatically over
the past two decades, from 302,000 in 1980 to 523,000 in 2003.6 In 2003,
child welfare agencies across the country investigated an estimated 2.9 mil-
lion reports of alleged child maltreatment,'7 and "substantiated" 661,210 of
these reports." Neglect is by far the most prevalent form of maltreatment
law review literature has yet to delve into this issue in depth. This Article is an attempt to begin
the discussion of necessary changes to the legal framework to facilitate as a legal matter what is
already happening as a matter of social work practice.
14. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2004); N.J.
STAT ANN. § 30:4C-1 (a) (West 2005).
15. In this Article, I use the terms "child welfare system" and "child protective services"
interchangeably to refer to the entire system designed to respond to the abuse and neglect of children.
16. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., THE AFCARS REPORT: PRELIMINARY FY 2003
ESTIMATES AS OF APRIL 2005, at 1 (2005) [hereinafter AFCARS FY 2003 ESTIMATES]. This
number is down from a high of 581,000 in 1999. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
THE AFCARS REPORT: INTERIM FY 1999 ESTIMATES AS OF JUNE 2001 (2001).
17. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD MALTREATMENT 2003, at xiii (2005)
[hereinafter CHILD MALTREATMENT].
18. Id. at 30 tbl. 3-1. There were an additional 106,662 "indicated cases." Id. In a
"substantiated" case, the state concludes the allegation of abuse or neglect is supported in
642
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(60.9 percent of cases), with physical abuse a distant second (18.9 percent);
sexual abuse is less likely to surface in the child welfare system (9.9 percent).' 9
Younger children are more likely to be maltreated than older children," and
infants are particularly vulnerable to maltreatment.2
A rights-based legal framework currently governs the child welfare system.
A central tension in the current system is whether to give greater primacy
to parents' rights or a strain of children's rights. This part describes that debate.
A. Parents' Rights
The child welfare system operates in the shadow of a long-standing
legal principle: A parent has a legally protected right to the care and cus-
tody of her child. This core principle has deep historical roots and signifi-
cant contemporary adherents in the legal academy; it has driven federal and
state legislation and shaped legal doctrine.
The idea of parents' rights is not new. Under Roman law, a father had
nearly complete control over his children, and the courts had no role in
mediating this relationship. This principle was embodied in the concept of
patria potestas--"[t]he authority held by the male head of a family ... over his
legitimate and adopted children, as well as further descendants in the male
line, unless emancipated," authority that included power over "life and
accordance with state law or policy; in an "indicated" case, the state suspects, but cannot
substantiate, abuse or neglect. See CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, CHILD MALTREATMENT 1 (2004).
19. See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra note 17, at 22. These percentages are from the total
number of cases (substantiated and indicated). The remaining cases involved either emotional
maltreatment, medical neglect, or "other" maltreatment. It is noteworthy that relatively few
children in the child welfare system are reported to be victims of sexual abuse. In light of the very
high incidence of child sexual abuse in the general population, see, e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson,
Children at Risk: The Sexual Exploitation of Female Children After Divorce, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 251, 261
(2001) ("[Alpproximately 20% of female children experience a serious, unwanted sexual assault
(ranging from manual interference with their genital area to completed intercourse) prior to their
eighteenth birthdays ...."), the low number of cases in the child welfare system involving child
sexual abuse is startling. Because child sexual abuse occurs across all socioeconomic classes, see,
e.g., KAREN L. KINNEAR, CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE 12 (1995); David Finkelhor, The Scope of the
Problem, in INTERVENING IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 9, 12 (Kathleen Murray & David A. Gough
eds., 1991), this discrepancy is some evidence that the child welfare system is more focused on the
maltreatment of children from low-income families than detecting and preventing child
maltreatment per se. Throughout this Article, I set aside the issue of child sexual abuse, which
raises distinct challenges that should be addressed separately.
20. The rate of victimization of children aged birth to three years is 16.4 per 1000 children,
and for children aged four to seven years is 13.8 per 1000 children. See CHILD MALTREATMENT,
supra note 17, at 23.
21. Children under the age of one account for 9.8 percent of all victims. See id. at 23, 42.
22. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *452.
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death.,,2' This tradition persisted. For example, during the colonial period in
this country, children were considered by divine authority to be the property
of their father; and a father was presumptively entitled to the services and
earnings of his children, provided he protected and educated them.24
Although this view of children as parental property has faded," the prin-
ciple that parents control their children, with minimal state intervention,
persists.26 The modem expression of this legal principle is found in four iconic
Supreme Court decisions,27 which established that substantive due process
protects parents' fundamental right to the "care, custody, and management of
their child."2
Solicitude for parents' rights has played out in two important ways within
the child welfare system. First, in deference to parents' rights,29 the state cannot
remove a child from the custody of a parent absent a showing of imminent
danger to the child."0 When the state does intervene, state statutes afford parents
23. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1206 (8th ed. 2004). This authority was located solely in
the father. See Sibylla Hiigge, On the History of Fathers' Rights and Mothers' Duty of Care, 3 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 377, 383 (1996). It was only upon the death of the father that custody would vestin the mother. See id. Interestingly, however, the descriptions of the absolute rights (and
concomitant duties) of fathers over their children set forth in this paragraph pertain only to
children born to a marriage. See Kristin Collins, Note, When Fathers' Rights Are Mothers' Duties: The
Failure of Equal Protection in Miller v. Albright, 109 YALE L.J. 1669, 1682-85 (2000) (describing
the common law tradition that fathers owed no obligation to, and had no parental rights over,
children born outside of marriage); see also Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the
Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 81-82 (2003) (discussing the same tradition).
24. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *452-*53 (describing the sacred
common law right of a father to the custody, labor, and earnings of his minor children); STEVEN
MINTZ & SUSAN KELLOGG, DOMESTIC REVOLUTIONS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN
FAMILY LIFE 1-16 (1988) (discussing the role of the "Godly" family in Puritan New England).
25. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 864 (2000) (discussing the shift awayfrom parental entitlements and toward children's interests as the organizing principle for family
law; "[tloday, parents' rights are thought to derive from-and to be limited by-their children's
interests"). But see Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 848-54(2004) (challenging this widely adopted narrative and noting "the persistence of common law
property norms in the law of parenthood").
26. Not all scholars agree with this historical narrative of minimal state intervention,
particularly as it relates to poor families. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal
History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 329-47 (2002) (arguing thatbeginning in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, extensive family regulation existed to
serve particularized state interests).
27. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
28. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (citing Yoder, Prince, Pierce, and Meyer).
29. As discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 73-74, this standard also protects
a child's interest in remaining with her biological parent.
30. This is true as a matter of constitutional law, see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255(1978), as well as of state statutory law. To remove a child from the custody of her parents, a state
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considerable procedural protections. For example, when a child is removed
from her home, parents typically enjoy statutory rights to counsel,3 to notice of
court proceedings, 32 to a hearing,33 and to introduce evidence at the hearing. 4
Second, until the late 1990s, federal child welfare legislation was crafted
to reinforce parents' rights. For example, the articulated goal of the first large-
scale federal regulation of child welfare, the Adoption Assistance and Child
Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), s was to preserve families, with only a
secondary goal of finding adoptive homes for children who could no longer live
with their families.36 Rather than emphasizing child safety at the expense of
preserving ties to a biological family (as in subsequent legislation), AACWA
focused on family preservation with the goal of keeping families together or
reunifying them. 7 Unless the situation was so unsafe for a child as to make
reunification impossible, termination of parental rights was discouraged.3"
The importance of parents' rights has been championed by a number of
legal scholars. They argue that parents are best situated to determine and act
in a child's best interest," at least in areas not particularly within the state's
typically must show not that removal would be in the "best interests" of the child, the standard
used for custody determinations in marital dissolutions, but rather that the child is "dependent" on
the state. States typically define dependency as a child who has been "abandoned, abused, or
neglected by the child's parent or parents or legal custodians," "ha[s] no parent or legal custodians
capable of providing supervision and care," or "[is] at substantial risk of imminent abuse,
abandonment, or neglect by the parent or parents or legal custodians." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 39.01(14)(a), (e) & (f) (West 2005); accord CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West 2005).
31. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7862 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.013(9)(a);
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5 (2005); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6337 (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 107.013(a)(1) (West 2004); see also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1981)
(holding that the Due Process Clause does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent
parents in termination of parental rights proceedings, but stating in dictum that "[i]nformed
opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed
counsel not only in parental termination proceedings, but in dependency and neglect proceedings
as well," and noting that at that time "33 States and the District of Columbia provide[d]
statutorily for the appointment of counsel in termination cases").
32. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.801.
33. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5.
34. See, e.g., id.; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6338(a).
35. See Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (amending sections 420-27 and 471-79(a) of the Social Security Act) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
36. See id. § 103, 94 Star. at 519 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 625 (a)(1) (2000)).
37. See id.
38. See id. (listing goals, including "preventing the unnecessary separation of children from
their families by identifying family problems, assisting families in resolving their problems, and
preventing breakup of the family where the prevention of child removal is desirable and possible").
39. See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 35-38
(2005); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). The Court stated in Parham:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a
child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making
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expertise.40 Thus, parents' rights create a buffer around parental deci-
sionmaking: Unless parents make decisions that transgress certain limits, the
state does not second-guess those decisions. This protection from state
intervention, moreover, safeguards cultural and moral diversity in matters of
childrearing by ensuring the state does not impose a uniform view of par-
enting.4' This diversity, in turn, serves democratic principles.42 Parents' rights
also protect parents from state intervention on impermissible grounds, such as
race, or for improper reasons, such as preferring one set of parents over
another purely for the material benefits available from the alternative family.
Such protections may be all that is available to a family otherwise vulnerable
to state intervention." Finally, procedural protections designed to protectparents' rights ensure the opportunity to counter the state's allegations of
abuse and neglect, which is particularly important in light of the widespread
dehumanization of parents involved in the child welfare system.44
life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that naturalbonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id.
40. See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 33 (arguing that "relative competencies" should guide the allocation ofdevelopmental control between parent and state, giving parents greater control over matters with onlyprivate effects, and the state control over matters in which the state has a direct stake, such as
education, which affects an individual's ability to participate in and contribute to "a healthy democracy
and economy").
41. Id. at 27 (noting that leaving the upbringing of children to private actors "would comport
with our commitment to pluralism by allowing one generation to perpetuate its own diversity, and
even expand upon it, in the next generation"); see also Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse andNeonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L. REV. 151, 160 (1988) ("[Tlhere is a sense in which the whole rights
approach itself is an elaborately constructed means of promoting pluralism.").
42. Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 959(1993). Dailey writes:
The family's role in nourishing and sustaining diverse moral traditions is what in partdistinguishes our liberal democracy from totalitarian political regimes .... As the locus
of potential political resistance, the family acts as an important institutional check on
the power of the state to mold citizens in its own image.
Id.
43. See Annette Ruth Appell, Virtual Mothers and the Meaning of Parenthood, 34 U. MICH.
JL. REFORM 683, 758-87 (2001).
44. See Symposium, The Rights of Parents With Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising
From Economic Hardship and the Predictive Power of Race, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 67-68 (2003).
Martin Guggenheim stated:
It is the element of hatred that I wish to mention for a minute. There is a shockingpresumption generated by fear, by otherness, by a lot of things -- hat the parents of
children in foster care are bad for their children. They don't love them enough or they don'thave the ability enough to raise them well. And I'm here to say that in my 30 years of work inthis field, that is the most despicable slander of all, and the most difficult falsity to refute.
Id. at 74.
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B. Children's Rights
As with parents' rights, the idea of children's rights has a deep (if more
recent) provenance, has led to legislation recognizing the interests of children,
and increasingly commands its own adherents in the legal academy. The
chameleonic term "children's rights" may be invoked to justify various ends.
In the child welfare context, children's rights are sometimes asserted against a
parent, as a claim to be free from abuse or neglect, and sometimes against the
state, as a claim against unnecessary state intervention that deprives a child
of her right to remain with her biological parent.4" In this section, I describe
both strains of children's rights-which I term protectionist children's rights
and preservationist children's rights-and discuss the ways in which the child
welfare system recognizes and advances the claims of each.46
Some scholars and advocates invoke protectionist children's rights as a
counterweight to their perception that the parents' rights model of child
welfare fails to protect children." To such scholars and advocates, the orga-
nizing principle of the child welfare system should be a child's need for safety
and permanence, not a parent's right to the care and custody of a child.48
The call for protectionist children's rights is not new. In the nine-
teenth century, courts began to modify the view of divine parental authority
45. Annette Appell describes the difference between these two strains of children's rights
as follows: rights that are akin to civil rights (such as the right to equal protection in education
and at least a limited right to free speech) and rights that are better understood as dependency
rights (located in a parent's responsibility to provide for a child and the concomitant right of the
state to oversee parents in this regard). See Annette Ruth Appell, Uneasy Tensions Between
Children's Rights and Civil Rights, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 154-61 (2004); see also Martha Minow, Rights for
the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 20 (1986)
("[R]ights represent the coinage of opposition to two kinds of power: the power of the parents and
the power of the state."). Appell notes the distinct difference between the two strains, arguing
that dependency rights "arise out of the child protection strain of parens patriae doctrine, a
tradition essentially aimed at social control, rather than tolerance or liberation, of non-dominant
populations and, of course, women." Appell, supra, at 141.
46. In his recent book, What's Wrong With Children's Rights, Martin Guggenheim ruefully
describes the split among children's rights advocates, noting that those who espouse protectionist
children's rights typically are considered "true" children's rights advocates, whereas those who
espouse preservationist children's rights (my labels, not his), are more commonly associated with
parents' rights-that is, they are not seen as advancing the interests of children. See GUGGENHEIM,
supra note 39, at 180.
47. See, e.g., id. at 34 (describing the growth of the children's rights movement as a
reaction to the traditional doctrine of parents' rights).
48. Although this child-centered orientation is not outcome determinative, and could lead
to reunification with a biological parent, the strongest supporters of child protection typically
favor intervention and removal. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69.
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to control children.49 Instead, courts located the authority to control chil-
dren as part of a parent's civic duty and with the understanding that the
child was a future citizen. In this view, the state played a role in regulating
parental authority by ensuring such authority was exercised in the interests of
children and the public. 0 Not coincidentally, at the same time courts were
articulating a new relationship among parents, children, and the state, there
was a growing societal awareness of the rights of children independent of
their parents. For example, the 1850s saw the beginning of a "child-saving"
movement, in which thousands of poor immigrant children living in cities
were sent to live on farms in the West, or were provided foster homes and
schooling.5' By the end of the nineteenth century, the child-saving
movement extended to removing abused children from their homes. s2 The
justification for this removal was framed as community control and, new to
the consciousness, "children's rights": 3 Instead of viewing children as the
property of fathers, property that could be used and abused, child-savers
developed a language of children's rights, a notion that justified their actions.54
This increased focus on children has shaped two notable aspects of the
present child welfare system. First, nearly every state now requires the
appointment of an advocate for a child in child welfare proceedings before a
court.5 Under federal law, such appointments are required as a condition of
receiving federal funds.5 6 These advocates, termed guardians ad litem in the
federal law (and defined by federal law as either an attorney or a court
appointed special advocate), typically represent the child's best interest,
although state schemes vary. 7 The use of advocates for children does not
49. See generally MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (G. Edward White ed., 1985).
50. See Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 737-39 (1988); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 995, 1038 (1992).
51. See SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 131-32 (2003); ELIZABETH PLECK,
DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 69-87 (2004).
52. See Woodhouse, supra note 50, at 1052.
53. See LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960, at 46-57 (1988) (discussing the general claim by child
protection organizations that they spoke for children's rights); Woodhouse, supra note 50, at 1052.
54. See Fineman, supra note 50, at 737-38; Woodhouse, supra note 50, at 1052.
55. See Howard Davidson, Supervising and Administering the Family: Child Protection Policy
and Practice at Century's End, 33 FAM. L.Q. 765, 768-69 (1999).
56. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(b)(2)(G),
88 Stat. 4, 7 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5107 (2000)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii),
§ 5106a(a)(2)(B)(ii).
57. See Davidson, supra note 55, at 768-69.
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necessarily reflect a protectionist or preservationist view of children's rights,5"
but it does reflect an attempt to give the child a voice in the legal proceeding.
Second, recent changes in federal law emphasize the child's health and
safety as paramount concerns of the child welfare system, rather than family
preservation. In 1997, both Congress and the Clinton Administration
determined that the child welfare system was not serving the interests of children
because family preservation efforts were keeping some children in dangerous
homes, the problem of "foster care drift"--the term used to describe both
long stays in foster care and placement in multiple homes-was getting
worse, and children would be better served by promoting adoption rather
than family preservation." Congress acted on these concerns with the
Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA).60 In ASFA, Congress determined
that permanency for the child was more important than preservation of the
biological family.6 Congress therefore changed the laws governing child
welfare to promote the adoption of children in foster care. To this end,
Congress set strict time limits on how long a state agency could continue to
work with the biological family, requiring states to commence proceedings
to terminate parental rights for children who had been in foster care for
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months.62
58. See Martin Guggenheim, Ethical Considerations in Child Welfare Cases: Duties of the Law
Guardian and the Parent's Attorney, in CHILD ABUSE, NEGLECT AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM
1988, at 657, 664 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. C4-4220, 1998)
(noting that children have the right "to remain in their parents' custody unless their parents have
been inadequate," but also that children "have the right to be protected from their parents when
their parents fall below the minimal standard of care established by law").
59. See Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and Failure of the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 643,646-50 (1999).
60. Adoption and Safe Families Act, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-632, 670-679).
61. The Act conditioned federal funds on states developing a foster care and adoption
assistance plan in which "the child's health and safety shall be the paramount concern." 42 U.S.C.
§ 671(a)(15)(A); accord Davidson, supra note 55, at 771 (noting that this provision was "based on
[the] fear that AACWA had been too focused on parental rights, thus risking the lives of some
children"). As one commentator has stated, the requirement that a child's interests take precedence
over the parent "places the potential conflicts of interest between children and their parents... in
stark relief." Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and
Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SoC. POL'Y & L. 176, 178 (2004).
62. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). Under the law, states are required to make "reasonable
efforts" to "preserve and reunify families," see id. §§ 671(a)(15)(B), 672(a)(1), but if reunification
is not possible, states must make "reasonable efforts ... to place the child in a timely manner in
accordance with the permanency plan." Id. § 671(a)(15)(C). There are three statutory
exceptions to the requirement that states make reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a family.
See id. §§ 671(a)(15)(D)(i)-(iii) (providing for the immediate removal of a child if the parent has
subjected the child to aggravating circumstances, including abandonment, torture, chronic abuse,
and sexual abuse; the parent has murdered another child; or the parent's rights have been
involuntarily terminated with respect to another child).
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Many legal scholars advocate protectionist children's rights as the
solution, or best approach, to the problems of the child welfare system.
Elizabeth Bartholet takes perhaps the most uncompromising stance,
decrying what she terms a "blood bias"63 in the current child welfare system, and
arguing that the system inadequately protects the well-being of children.
She contends that a cult of family autonomy-perpetuated and protected
by both ends of the political spectrum'-and an unwavering devotion to
same-race and kinship placement, compromise children's best chances for
being raised in a stable family home.65 Bartholet argues for an expansion of
the "village" responsible for raising the child: from the extended family and
community to the entire society.66 To this end, Bartholet recommends that
society err on the side of intervening in a family, contending that under-
intervention bedevils the current child welfare system.67 Society first should
attempt to prevent child abuse and neglect, and, failing such prevention,
Bartholet urges prompt removal of children from abusive and neglectful
homes, expedited termination of parental rights, and placement of these
children in adoptive homes.66 As she summarizes her view:
The most extreme forms of intervention work best for children.
Children placed in foster homes do better than children whose fami-
lies are kept together, and children placed in adoptive homes do better
yet. They would do even better if we moved them on to adoption
promptly, rather than subjecting them to the kind of damaging delays
69that routinely occur in today's system.
In my view, advocates of protectionist children's rights typically are
motivated by the well-documented adverse effects of abuse and neglect on
children,0 and two assumptions. First, a fundamental political and eco-
nomic reorientation of our society to help low-income families is not
forthcoming. Second, the current rights-based system of child welfare is not
going to change. Based on these assumptions, protectionist children's rights
63. BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 7.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 4-8, 13.
66. See id. at 2-4.
67. See id. at 99.
68. See id. at 199-201.
69. Id. at 110.
70. See, e.g., Martin H. Teicher, Wounds That Time Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child
Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM 50, 50-67 (2000). For a summary of this research, see Martin H. Teicher,
Scars That Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child Abuse, Sci. AM., Mar. 2002, at 68 (discussing a
recent study demonstrating that maltreatment during formative years can affect the development
of the brain in ways that cannot later be cured).
650 53 UCLA LAW REVIEW 637 (2006)
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advocates tip the balance between family preservation and child
protection heavily in favor of intervention to protect the child."
In contrast to the protectionist strain of children's rights, the preserva-
tionist strain of children's rights reflects the view that unnecessary state
intervention in the family violates a child's right to remain with her bio-
logical parent. In this way, family preservation reflects both parents' rights
(not to have a child removed unnecessarily) and children's rights (not to be
removed unnecessarily). The Supreme Court has acknowledged, if not fully rec-
ognized, this preservationist view of children's rights. For example, in Santosky
v. Kramer,72 the Court began its analysis of the burden of proof required by the
Fourteenth Amendment in a proceeding to terminate a parent's rights by
recognizing the right of a parent to the care and custody of a child. 3 The Court
then stated that, until the state demonstrated parental unfitness, "the child and
his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their
natural relationship.
74
Some legal scholars contend that preservationist children's rights are
essential to the well-being of children. For example, Martin Guggenheim
decries the split among advocates of children's rights, contending that pres-
ervationists care deeply about children.7 ' As Guggenheim argues, and as I
71. Other scholars have taken the call for children's rights to even greater lengths. For
example, James Dwyer has argued for the complete abrogation of parents' rights, contending that
protectionist children's rights should be the basis for protecting the interests of children, with only
a child-rearing privilege residing in parents. See Dwyer, supra note 2, at 1373-76. Although Dwyer
develops his approach in the context of parents' religious rights, he does not limit the applicability
of his theory to this context. In another article, he suggests that a "best interests" standard may be a
more appropriate standard to govern the termination of parental rights. See, e.g., James G. Dwyer,
Children's Interests in a Family Context-A Cautionary Note, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1053, 1067
(1999). Both Dwyer and Bartholet argue that the construction of parents' rights as a barrier to
state intervention, although widely accepted, has been roundly rejected in what they argue is the
analogous circumstance of domestic violence. See id. at 1060, 1063; BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 7-8.
72. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
73. Id. at 753.
74. Id. at 760 (emphasis added); accord id. at 765 (noting that the appellate court's theory
that a lower standard "properly allocates the risk of error between the parents and the
child ... assumes that termination of the natural parents' rights invariably will benefit the child.
Yet we have noted above that the parents and the child share an interest in avoiding erroneous
termination."). Similarly, in Parham v. J.R., the Court addressed the procedural due process
requirements necessary when a parent commits a minor to a mental hospital for treatment. See
442 U.S. 584 (1979). The Court addressed a concern with a formalized, adversarial hearing
reviewing the parent's decision, noting that "requiring a formalized, factfinding hearing ... poses
I] significant intrusion into the parent-child relationship. Pitting the parents and child as
adversaries often will be at odds with the presumption that parents act in the best interests of their
child." Id. at 610.
75. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 39, at 180-81; see also ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 257 ("What
is advocated as benefiting children in foster care contradicts the traditional understanding of
children's need to maintain a relationship with their parents."); Naomi R. Cahn, Children's
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discuss in greater detail below, 6 the foster care system is not populated
solely with severely abused or neglected children who are placed in foster
care because of serious threats to their safety.7 Rather, most children are
removed unnecessarily from their homes.78 He concludes that "[tihe ease
with which children enter foster care and the needless time they spend
there should be among the highest concerns of those who care about chil-
dren's well-being." 9
Thus, the debate about the appropriate balance of children's rights and
parents' rights in the child welfare system is more accurately described as
one between family preservationists (those who disfavor intervention with a
bias toward removal) and child protectionists (those who favor more aggressive
state intervention). Both sides criticize the other for undervaluing the
welfare of children.80
C. Alternatives and Compromises
Some scholars have tried to formulate alternatives to the stark choices
between parents' rights and children's rights, or between family preserva-
tion and child protection. One move to distance the debate from rights
talk is to posit a theory of children's interests, rather than rights, because,
the argument goes, children are not well served by rights. It has also been
Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189,1206 (1999)("Respecting families does not mean jeopardizing children. It is not a choice in which we respect
either parents or children; their rights generally do not conflict. Instead of reifying a dichotomy
between the interests of parents and the interests of children, we should recognize that, in most
cases, they overlap significantly.").
76. See infra text accompanying notes 149-154.
77. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 39, at 192-96.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 195.
80. See, e.g., BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 237 ("We make family preservation the primary
goal even after serious abuse and neglect have been identified, with little regard to whether this
serves children's interests. We pretend that ... parents' interests and children's interests can be
equated, when we know better."); GUGGENHEIM, supra note 39, at 208 ("In far too many cases, I
have come to conclude that [the] person who cares most about the children who are the subjects
of the case is my client-the one regarded by everyone else as the child's greatest enemy .... Most
disturbing of all, this unstated judgment of the parents' unsuitability has been disguised and
translated into a children's rights claim.").
81. A focus on interests has led some commentators to argue, for example, that children do
better in two-parent households, and therefore that the law should not focus on rights but instead
attempt to fortify relationships between parents by strengthening the institution of marriage. Lynn
Wardle contends that rights talk diminishes the role of the family and that "[c]hildren's rights
advocates often are too quick to give up on families." Lynn E. Wardle, The Use and Abuse of
Rights Rhetoric: The Constitutional Rights of Children, 27 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 331 (1996); accord
id. at 343-48 (arguing for the strengthening and protection of marriage, not as a panacea for all
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 652 2005-2006
Rights Myopia in Child Welfare 653
argued that, as a strategic matter, a theory of children's interests will be
more palatable to adult decisionmakers. These decisionmakers will identify
with other adults, such as parents, and therefore may be hostile to a concept
of children's rights because such rights will be perceived as diminishing the
rights of adults."
Beyond changes to the nomenclature, some scholars have suggested
specific changes to the legal system. For example, Marsha Garrison has
argued for an accommodation between seeking a stable, permanent home
for the child and continued contact with the biological parent.83 She con-
tends that even when reunification is not feasible and a child's need for
permanence may justify depriving the parent of her right to custody, there is
still room for a continued relationship between the biological parent and
child. 4 In her view, there need not be an all-or-nothing approach to the
termination of parental rights, and complete termination of such rights
may, in many cases, be damaging to children. Garrison has proposed a
higher standard for the complete termination of parental rights: Such ter-
mination may occur "only after a judicial finding that the child will otherwise
suffer specific, significant harm and that any alternative short of ter-
mination will not avert that harm. ' 5
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse contends that parents are the trustees,
not owners, of their children."s She argues that replacing "rights talk" with
the language of parental obligation would focus the system on children
rather than adults.s7 Woodhouse argues that a parent should have to earn a stake
problems facing children, but as one proven method for protecting children because children in
two-parent homes do far better on all indicators than children from single-parent homes). Bruce
Hafen has argued that recognizing children's rights-a claim for "democratic egalitarianism among
all family members"--diminishes parents rights, and that such rights reinforce parental authority,
which serves children's interests because it provides security, role-modeling, socialization, and
leadership in the family. See Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism:
Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights," 1976 BYU L. REV. 605, 654.
82. See Martin Guggenheim, Maximizing Strategies for Pressuring Adults to Do Right by
Children, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 774-78 (2003).
83. See Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 446-55 (1983).
Garrison notes that permanency is the value most often cited in support of a child-oriented child
welfare system. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 425.
86. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on
Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1755 (1993) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Hatching the
Egg]; see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's
Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 321, 321 (1994) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Out of
Children's Needs]. Woodhouse terms this perspective "generism," which she defines as a focus on the
next generation rather than the present generation.
87. See Woodhouse, Out of Children's Needs, supra note 86, at 321.
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in her child's life; that it should not be granted automatically as an incident
of procreation.88 Importantly, Woodhouse believes that "a child-centered
perspective calls for a rhetoric that speaks less about competing rights and
more about adult responsibility and children's needs," and therefore she
consciously avoids the term "children's rights." 9 In the context of the child
welfare system, Woodhouse has proposed an environmentalist model for
child welfare that focuses on the ecology of the child, rather than the child
as an isolated individual.9"
To address the reality that adults will still make decisions, even if
doing so in a child-centered fashion,9' Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott
have argued for a fiduciary model of parenting in which parents are viewed
as agents exercising their legal responsibility to protect their children, who,
because of their age, are unable to act in their own best interests.92 Scott
and Scott contend this model would serve the interests of both parents and
children because it would encourage parents to act in the interests of chil-
dren; to the extent parents do so, they would be rewarded with legal defer-
ence to their choices.93 Although Scott and Scott conclude that family law
generally accords with this principle,94 they point out that this is less true in
the child welfare context, where courts' reluctance to terminate parental
88. See Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg, supra note 86, at 1754, 1757 (arguing that the
generism model "affirm[s] the centrality of children to family and society" and "defin[es] parenting
as the meeting of children's needs").
89. Id. at 1841. Woodhouse distinguishes the civil rights movement and feminism, both of
which sought to gain rights equal to white men, because of the unique position of children as
nonautonomous beings. As she notes, children, while they remain children, do not "and likely
never will directly exercise individual rights or collective political power." Id. at 1843.
90. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Reframing the Debate About the Socialization of Child
Welfare: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 CHI. LEGAL F. 85, 85 ("I would replace the paradigm
in which parents and the state are pitted against each other with a paradigm in which parents and
the state act as partners in ensuring an environment conducive to children's healthy
development."). Woodhouse terms this approach "ecogenerism." See id. at 86.
91. See Guggenheim, supra note 82, at 781 ("[Tlhe [children's] rights discourse of the past
thirty-five years masks the reality that children will never be given things by adults that adults do
not want them to have."). Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott note that:
Simply shifting the focus of legal regulation toward greater protection of the needs of
children is unhelpful, in our view. This is so not because such a perspective
misunderstands the social goals that drive the regulation of parent-child relationships,
but rather because a child-centered approach, standing alone, will not lead reliably to
legal rules that effect those objectives .... This goal is more likely to be achieved if the
law focuses principally on the relationship between parent and child, rather than on the
child's needs per se. Parents are not fungible child rearers.
Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401,2414-15 (1995).
92. See Scott & Scott, supra note 91, at 2401-03.
93. See id. at 2439-41, 2462-63.
94. See id. at 2462.
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rights dilutes "the law's instrumental function of encouraging parental
commitment.''" In the child welfare context, Scott and Scott note that the
typical criticism that states do not terminate parental rights because of defer-
ence to those rights is oversimplified. In their view, the threat of termination
usefully motivates parents who are willing and, more importantly, able, to
regain custody. But, as Scott and Scott describe, another category of
parents exists: those parents who have lost custody of their children and are
unable to make the necessary changes to their lives to regain custody, but
who nonetheless maintain a significant relationship with their children.
For these parents, courts often do not terminate parental rights, thus under-
cutting the threat of termination for all parents. These mixed messages
prevent the child welfare system from living up to the fiduciary ideal.96
Although these innovative perspectives move beyond the all-or-
nothing aspect of the debate over parents' rights versus children's rights, as
proposals they lack methods for meaningful implementation. In the current
adversarial system, there is little room to craft alternatives to rights, or new
accommodations between the rights of parent and child, between preserva-
tion and protection. Before searching for a new model that would better
facilitate an alignment between parents, children, and the state, I will pre-
sent my own arguments for rejecting the rights-based framework. As I show
in Part II, the focus on rights simply does not serve families well and should
not take center stage in the majority of cases.
II. LIMITATIONS OF THE RIGHTS-BASED MODEL
Despite the theoretical promise of parents' rights and children's rights
(both preservationist and protectionist strains), rights do not sufficiently
protect parents or children. A solely rights-based approach to the issues
that surface in the child welfare system is misguided and, for the majority of
cases, fails to devise effective solutions for parents or children. This part
explores why this is, first identifying three failures of rights as implemented,
and then examining two conceptual shortcomings of rights.
Before exploring the limitations of rights in the child welfare system,
however, I want to clarify the cabined nature of my critique. First, I limit
my critique to the context of the child welfare system. For example, I do
not intend to undervalue the importance of rights to claims of racial and
95. Id. at 2469.
96. See id. at 2468-69.
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gender equality.97 Second, parents' rights and preservationist children's
rights play a crucial role in the child welfare system, creating an important
divide between the state and the family. I do not advocate weakening this
divide such that it is easier for the state to insert itself into the lives of
families, especially poor families." Instead, my argument concerns the
state's interaction with families who are already in the system. The argument
assumes the state already has demonstrated an adequate need to intervene.
My point is that some families face real problems-substance abuse,
seriously inadequate housing, lack of appropriate child care-and that these
problems can lead or contribute to child abuse and neglect. The issue is
how the state will address these problems. In such cases, a myopic focus on
rights risks obscuring the larger picture of the issues affecting families in the
child welfare system, in turn doing a considerable disservice to both parents
and children. Thus, my critique is largely about the incompleteness of par-
ents' rights and children's rights, not the absolute disutility of such rights.
A. The Failure of Rights as Implemented
This subpart sets aside the question of the utility of rights as a concep-
tual matter, and instead examines the rights-based model as it is currently
implemented. Looking at rights through this real world lens, I conclude
that a solely rights-based system does not produce good results for parents or
children. I focus on three main limitations of rights as implemented: the
failure of rights to protect sufficiently against racially and politically driven
decisionmaking, the limited effectiveness of procedural safeguards and court
adjudications, and the high cost to children of state intervention.
Rights do not protect against racially and politically driven decisionnaking.
As implemented, rights do not prevent state intervention based on imper-
missible grounds, such as race. It is undisputed that racial disparities in the
child welfare system exist and are marked. For example, in 2002, although
African American children accounted for 15 percent of all children in the
97. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 216-47 (2001) (setting forth
cases recognizing the right to sex equality); Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331,
1356-58 (1988) (critiquing critical legal scholars for discounting the importance of rights to
advancing claims of racial equality).
98. See Appell, supra note 43, at 686 (critiquing various proposals to weaken parents' rights by
arguing that such proposals do not sufficiently protect families who are most vulnerable to
state intervention).
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U.S., they accounted for 25 percent of substantiated maltreatment reports.99 By
contrast, white children accounted for 79 percent of all children and 51 percent
of substantiated reports." African American children enter foster care at a
higher rate ' and leave at a lower rate.
10 2
The cause of these racial disparities is a hotly contested issue. Some
scholars contend the disparities are due to racial bias. ' °3 Indeed, there is evidence
that African American children are removed at greater rates than similarly
situated white and Latino children," and receive less effective services.'05 Other
scholars contend that the disparities are explained by differential poverty
rates."06 If the disparities are the result of racial bias, then it is clear that, as imple-
mented, parents' rights and preservationist children's rights are not
sufficiently protecting African American families from such bias. If the
disparities are due to poverty, rights are still not the proper tool for protecting
parents and children."0 '
Additionally, removal of children is often heavily influenced by politi-
cal and social forces. For example, there is evidence that foster care placements
99. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN OF
COLOR IN THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE CHILD WELFARE
COMMUNITY 3 (2003).
100. Id.
101. Eight African American children for every 1000 enter foster care, versus three white
children for every 1000. See Richard Wertheimer, Youth Who "Age Out" of Foster Care: Troubled
Lives, Troubling Prospects, CHILD TRENDS RES. BRIEF (Child Trends, Washington, D.C.), Dec.
2002, at 1, 2 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GREEN BOOK 2000).
102. Thirty-three percent of African American children left foster care in 1999 versus 53 percent
of white children. See id. at 1.
103. See ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 47.
104. See id. at 47-49.
105. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, supra note 99, at 8.
106. Naomi Cahn, while agreeing with Roberts that African American children are
overrepresented in the child welfare system, argues that this overrepresentation could be attributed
to poverty and not racial bias because the poverty rate for African American households is almost
double the rate for white households. See Naomi Cahn, Race, Poverty, History, Adoption, and
Child Abuse: Connections, 36 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 461, 474-75 (2002). Roberts rebuts the poverty
explanation by arguing that poverty cannot account for the overrepresentation of African
American children because equally poor Latino children are less likely to be involved in the child
welfare system than their African American counterparts. See ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 48. She
notes that African American and Latino children in San Diego, for example, have a similar
socioeconomic status, but their rates of representation in the child welfare system are very different.
Latino children were involved in the system "at a rate identical to their proportion of the
population [however] African American children were overrepresented in foster care at a rate six
times their census proportion." Id. (citing Ann F. Garland et al., Minority Populations in the Child
Welfare System: The Visibility Hypothesis Reexamined, 68 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 142, 145-46
(1998)). Moreover, the relationship between poverty and racism is complex. See, e.g., Michael Katz,
Refraining the Class Debate, in A NEW INTRODUCTION TO POVERTY: THE ROLE OF RACE, POWER
AND POLITICS 59 (Louis Cushnick & James Jennings eds., 1999).
107. See infra text accompanying notes 155-172.
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soar in the aftermath of well-publicized cases of abuse,' 8 and placement
rates vary from state to state, even when the states are geographically
proximate, and economically and politically similar."° State agencies also
are more likely to err on the side of caution when determining if abuse or
neglect has occurred, thus leading to the removal of many children who
could have stayed home."' If rights were sufficiently protective in practice, such
variances would not occur because only considerations pertaining to
particular parents and children, not external political and social factors,
would affect the decision.
Procedural safeguards and court adjudications are insufficiently protective of
parents. Procedural safeguards that should, in theory, guard against
improper removals are virtually meaningless for many parents because they
are often bypassed in real life. For example, most procedural protections,
such as the assistance of counsel, are not triggered during the early and
often dispositive stages of a case."' Parents often consent to a "voluntary"
arrangement, agreeing to participate in specified programs and sometimes
placing a child with an extended family member, in exchange for the state
not placing the child in foster care."2 Or a parent may agree to the placement
108. See John Courtney et al., Aggressive Prosecutions Flooding the System, CHILD WELFARE WATCH(Ctr. for an Urban Future, New York, N.Y.), Winter 1999, at 4, 4 (documenting a 55 percent increase infilings of neglect cases and a 57 percent increase in filings of abuse cases from 1995 to 1998 following the
well-publicized death of Elisa Izquierdo, a six-year-old girl subjected to fatal abuse by her mother).
109. See id.
110. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 39, at 194. Guggenheim states:
Courts and government reports alike regularly conclude that the current scheme resultsin a bias toward over-reporting and over-labeling child abuse and neglect. Indeed, one
federal study found that investigators are more than twice as likely to "substantiate" a
case erroneously than to mislabel a case "unfounded." Moreover, many studies have
found that as many as two-thirds of those cases labeled "substantiated" do not involve
serious charges.
Id. Peggy Cooper Davis and Gautam Barua describe what they termed the "sequentiality effect" of
custodial decisionmaking in the child welfare system, arguing that decisions made at one stage of
the proceedings will be repeated and reinforced at later stages in the proceeding, regardless of the
correctness of the first decision. See Peggy Cooper Davis & Gautam Barua, Custodial Choices forChildren at Risk: Bias, Sequentiality, and the Law, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 139, 146 (1995).
Davis and Barua further conclude that "interim decisions [in child welfare proceedings] are morelikely to err on the side of intervention" and removal of the child, therefore this bias persists and is
compounded as the case proceeds. Id. at 157.
111. For example, initial investigations of abuse and neglect, which are often conducted by
caseworkers with minimal or nonexistent training, put parents at a disadvantage. See DUNCAN
LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 7 (2d ed. 2004); Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and Parents
Wronged, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 431, 433 (1996). Knowing that their ability to retain custody of a
child is at stake, parents often cooperate with the investigation rather than resisting it from the
start. See id. Parents do not have the assistance of counsel or the oversight of a judge when
responding to the investigations. See id. at 434.
112. See Buss, supra note 111, at 434.
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of a child with child protective services for up to six months, during which period
there is no court review."l 3 Although these cases are ultimately reviewed by a
court, any unnecessary placement negatively affects both parent and child.1
If and when a parent makes it into court, she is unlikely to receive
meaningful review of her case. Lawyers for parents often do not provide
adequate representation, "5 and most courts simply do not have sufficient time
or resources to dedicate to these cases. Consider one anecdotal description of
family court:
In many jurisdictions, particularly those in large urban areas, the
courts are overwhelmed by the size of their caseloads: Overtaxed
judges hear "lists" of up to 100 cases a day, giving each case a maxi-
mum of five minutes. Families are sworn in en masse at the bar of the
court, with little sense that what they say to the judge thereafter con-
stitutes sworn testimony, rather than a free-for-all conversation.
Judges bark at the parties, calling parents "Mom" or "Dad," rather
than by their names. Orders typically are entered without any articu-
lation of findings of fact, conclusions of law, or even a recitation of
the relevant legal standards in justification. If a party determines
that she needs more than five minutes of the court's attention to
resolve a disputed issue-even an issue as important as whether a child
should remain in foster care, whether a parent should be allowed to
visit her child, or whether the state should be required to provide the
parent with supportive services-she will have to wait months to get
a new date in court.16
Thus, although parents' rights theoretically entitle parents to certain proce-
dural safeguards and court review of the state's actions, in practice these
entitlements offer little protection due to "voluntary" arrangements, over-
burdened courts, and poor counsel.
113. See id.
114. See LINDSEY, supra note 111, at 171 (finding that parents who have their children
placed in foster care are less likely to receive the services they needed in the first place, thus
exacerbating the problem). Buss concurs, observing:
While these cases will eventually be reviewed by a court, the damage to the parents and
child of an inappropriate removal will already have been done. At a minimum, the
families will have suffered up to six months of inappropriate separation. At a maximum,
the removal will accelerate whatever problems the parents were having and undermine
an already troubled relationship between parent and child.
Buss, supra note 111, at 434.
115. Although there are notable exceptions, many appointed counsel provide poor
representation. See Buss, supra note 111, at 437.
116. Id. at 434-35 (footnotes omitted). But see Amy Sinden, "Why Won't Mom
Cooperate?": A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 YALE. J.L. & FEMINiSM 339,
376-96 (1999) (describing the dangers of informal dispute resolution processes in child welfare
and arguing in favor of, at least in the absence of a better alternative, the current procedural safeguards).
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The state intervention required to enforce protectionist children's rights
comes at a high cost to children. Protectionist children's rights, while appeal-
ing in theory, do not necessarily protect children. To begin, despite the
widespread appointment of guardians ad litem and the changes required by
ASFA, the child welfare system does not serve the vast majority of children
well. As discussed more fully below, only about 10 percent of cases in the
child welfare system involve severe abuse or neglect.' For these children,
removal and placement in a foster home is likely the best outcome because
of the danger in the home. But for the remaining cases, although some
intervention may be necessary, intervening by removing the child and
placing her in foster care comes at high cost.
In addition to the pain associated with the (even temporary) loss of a
biological family, consider the impact on a child of living in foster care.
Once a child is placed in foster care, she is likely to remain there for nineteen
months, with a substantial likelihood she will remain in care for three, four,
or even five years."' Approximately half of the children in foster care return
to their biological families, but of the remaining children, only 18 percent are
adopted; the remainder live with relatives, are emancipated, or live in legal
limbo. "9 Children who are freed for adoption often must wait years'20 before
being adopted because there are not enough adoptive families.' 2' Therefore,
adoptions do not keep pace with the terminations of parental rights.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 149-154.
118. Although the average stay in foster care is nineteen months, 11 percent of children
remain for two to three years, 11 percent remain for three to four years, and 9 percent remain in
care for five or more years. See NAT'L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER CARE NATIONAL STATISTICS 4 (2003).
119. Fifty-five percent of the children who leave foster care return to live with their
biological families, 18 percent are adopted, 11 percent live with a relative or guardian, 8 percent
are emancipated, 4 percent have legal guardians, and the remainder are in legal limbo. See
AFCARS FY 2003 ESTIMATES, supra note 16, at 3. The children in "limbo" were transferred to
another agency or were runaways. See id. An emancipated child in the context of child welfare
means a child who is not adopted or reunited with a biological parent, but rather moves from
foster care to independent living. In 2001, 19,000 children "aged out" of foster care, becoming
"emancipated" adults. See Wertheimer, supra note 101, at 1.
120. In 2003, there were 119,000 children awaiting adoption. See AFCARS FY 2003
ESTIMATES, supra note 16, at 4. Children waited an average of forty-four months for an adoptive
home after parental rights were terminated, see id., and a significant portion of children waited
even longer (23 percent waited thirty-nine to fifty-nine months, and 24 percent waited sixty
months or longer), see id. The report defines "children waiting to be adopted" as those "who have
a goal of adoption and/or whose parental rights have been terminated. Children 16 years old and
older whose parental rights have been terminated and who have a goal of emancipation have been
excluded from the estimate." Id.
121. For example, in 2003, although 68,000 children had their parental rights terminated,
only 50,000 were adopted out of foster care. See id. at 3, 5.
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Children in foster care face many difficulties, both while in care and later as
adults. A child in foster care is often moved from one home to another."' Even
if eventually reunified with a biological parent or placed in an adoptive home,
children who were once in foster care typically suffer economic, educational, and
psychological hardship." Indeed, a recent study found the rate of post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD) among adults previously placed in foster care to be twice
as high as the incidence in combat veterans.2 In addition to PTSD, former
foster care children suffer from depression, social phobia, panic syndrome, and
anxiety disorders. 2' Even if the removal is temporary, the experience of being
removed from a home is deeply traumatizing to a child.
126
122. See PEW COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTERING THE FUTURE: SAFETY,
PERMANENCE AND WELL-BEING FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 9 (2004) (reporting that in 2002,
44 percent of children exiting foster care lived in one home, 22 percent lived in two homes, 27 percent
lived in three or more homes, and 10 percent lived in five or more homes).
123. Children in foster care exhibit significantly more behavioral and adaptive functioning problems
than children in the general population. See June M. Clausen et al., Mental Health Problems of Children in
Foster Care, 7 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 283,284 (1998). Seventy-five to 80 percent of school-aged children
in foster care score in the problematic range of behavior problem and social competence domains of the
Child Behavior Checklist. See id. at 292. Furthermore, children who have been placed in foster care are
also at risk of developmental problems, such as gross motor, fine motor, and cognitive delays. See Molly
Murphy Garwood & Wendy Close, Identifying the Psychologal Needs of Foster Children, 32 CHILD
PSYCHIATRY & HUM. DEv. 125, 126 (2001). The long-term outcomes are particularly poor for children
emancipated from foster care (youth who are not adopted or reunited, but rather transition from foster care
to independent living). About half of these children do not finish high school, have histories of job
instability, and are paid less than their nonfoster care peers. See Richard P. Barth, On Their Own: The
Exeriences of Youth After Foster Care, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK J. 419-40 (1990); Ronna J.
Cook, Are We Helping Foster Care Youth Prepare for Their Future?, 16 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVS. REV.
213-29 (1994); Mark E. Courtney et al., Foster Youth Transitions to Adulthood: A Longitudinal View of Youth
Leaving Care, 80 CHILD WELFARE 685 (2001); Mark E Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult
Functioning of Former Foster Youth: Outcomes at Age 19 (2005), available at http://www.chapinhall.org/
article abstract.aspx?ar=1355&L2=61&L 3 =130 (last visited Dec. 15, 2005). As many as 25 percent report
being homeless for at least one night, see id. at 710; 40 percent report receiving some sort of welfare, see
Cook, supra, at 219-20; and, perhaps most troubling, 60 percent of young women leaving foster care were
pregnant or already parenting within twelve to eighteen months after leaving the foster care system. See id. at 222.
124. Press Release, Casey Family Programs, Former Foster Children in Washington and
Oregon Suffer Post Traumatic Stress Disorder at Twice the Rate of U.S. War Veterans, According to
New Study (Apr. 6, 2005) (on file with author).
125. Id. This is not surprising given that, on average, children in foster care experience more
than fourteen environmental, social, biological, and psychological risk factors that make them
vulnerable to psychological problems. See Garwood & Close, supra note 123, at 126 (citing M.B.
Thorpe & G.T. Swart, Risk and Protective Factors Affecting Children in Foster Care: A Pilot Study of the
Role of Siblings, 37 CANADIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 616 (1992)).
126. See generally 3 JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND LOSS 7-14, 397-411 (1980); 2 id. at
13, 245-57 (1973); 1 id. at 27-30,330 (1969) (documenting the psychological and emotional trauma
to a child separated unnecessarily from her parent); Wendy L. Haight et al., Parent-Child Interaction
During Foster Care Visits, 46 SOC. WORK 325, 337-38 (2000) (reporting that a study on parent-child
visitation during separation indicates the importance of reducing the time the parent and child are
separated because of the disruptive impact of the separation on the parent-child relationship, and the
risk of attachment related issues for the child).
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These studies often do not control for prior abuse! or neglect. Thus, it
could be argued that the poor outcomes are a result of abuse and neglect at the
hands of the original parent and not because of the subsequent placement
into foster care. At the very least, however, it is clear that foster care does
not improve the lives of most of the children placed in that system. And
there is good reason to believe that foster care is a contributing factor to the
poor outcomes studied. While in foster care, there is substantial evidence
that children are at risk for additional abuse, particularly sexual abuse. For
example, a study in Maryland found that foster families were more likely to
be reported for physical abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect than nonfoster
families.'27 Of the abuse and neglect occurring in foster care, nearly half
(48.7 percent) involved sexual abuse.'2s In addition, children in foster care
are likely to suffer from medically related neglect. From a sample of foster
children in California, New York, and Pennsylvania, the U.S. General
Accounting Office estimated that "12 percent of young foster children received
no routine health care, 34 percent received no immunizations, and 32 percent
had at least some identified health needs that were not met.' 129
In sum, any theory of protectionist children's rights necessarily entails
greater state intervention in the family, and research demonstrates that
such intervention comes at a very high cost to the well-being of children.
For children who have suffered severe abuse and neglect at the hands of their
biological parents, the foster care system may well be a better alternative. But
for children who are removed from their homes for less serious abuse or neglect,
placement in the foster care system is seldom a good solution. Although it
is tempting to idealize a better home for the child-a loving, stable home
with supportive adults-foster care too often fails to provide children with
such homes. Further, the experience of being removed from the original
home is typically so debilitating, and the ill effects are so long-lasting, that
even a supportive foster home cannot compensate for the devastating
experience of removal and the loss of a family.
127. See Mary I. Benedict et al., Types and Frequency of Child Maltreatment by Family FosterCare Providers in an Urban Population, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 577, 581 (1994) ("[Foster
families were almost seven times more likely to be reported for physical abuse as compared tofamilies in the community ... [and] had a four-fold greater risk of report for sexual abuse. The
same families were almost twice as likely to be reported for neglect than nonfoster families."); see
also id. at 577-85.
128. See Mary I. Benedict et al., The Reported Health and Functioning of Children Maltreated
While in Family Foster Care, 20 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 561, 563 (1996). The perpetrator was
a foster father or other foster family member in more than two-thirds of the incidents and another
foster child in the home in 20 percent of the incidents. See id.
129. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., FOSTER CARE: HEALTH NEEDS OF MANY YOUNG CHILDREN
ARE UNKNOWN AND UNMET, GAOl HEHS-95-114, at 2 (Washington D.C. May 26, 1995).
662
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 662 2005-2006
Rights Myopia in Child Welfare 663
These are just three of the problems with the rights-based model as
currently implemented. Certainly others exist. 131 One question, then, is
whether these problems could be fixed while still retaining the rights-based
model. It could be argued that an infusion of resources into the child welfare
system would correct these problems by, for example, providing adequate
counsel for parents and sufficient time for judges to hear cases. While it is
possible that additional resources or other changes would at least mitigate the
problems, such changes would not address the more fundamental, conceptual
shortcomings of rights. It is to these shortcomings that I now turn.
B. The Conceptual Shortcomings of Rights
Regardless of the available resources, a solely rights-based framework is
inadequate to address the problems in the child welfare system for two cen-
tral reasons. First, rights assume autonomy, and most parents in the child
welfare system need tangible assistance rather than autonomy.'3' In this
way, rights obscure the role of poverty in the child welfare system. Second,
130. For example, the rights-based system leads to a one-size-fits-all child welfare system,
rather than context-driven decisions. See Ross, supra note 61, at 178-79, 192-93. Concepts of
rights determine standards of removal of children. If preference is given to parents' rights and
preservationist children's rights, then children will be removed only in extreme circumstances. If
preference is given to protectionist children's rights, then children will be removed more
frequently. As legal scholars have noted, this is a question of whether the system should be overinclusive or
underinclusive. See Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Parental Rights and the Ugly Duckling, 1 J.L.
& FAM. STUD. 41, 59 (1999) (noting that a disabled child is more likely to be abused than
a nondisabled child, particularly if an unrelated adult is in the house, and concluding that taking
disability "into account will increase the costs of over-inclusiveness: more disabled children will
be taken from fit parents. But as we believe that present termination rules are too lax, we suggest
that under-inclusiveness costs, including permanent damage to children, are a far greater concern
than those of over-inclusiveness."). But the requirement that the system choose between
removing too many children or too few children hardly seems like the best way to design a system.
The relevant question should be what is best for this family. It may be that due to a particular
history of relapse from substance abuse, a child should be removed more readily than a one-size-
fits-all standard would permit. Conversely, where there is a particularly strong relationship
between a parent and child, despite maltreatment of that child, there may be compelling reasons
for keeping that family together, with adequate safeguards for the child. Although the current
rights-based system could, in theory, permit individualized decisionmaking, it does not. This is
because theories of rights drive legal standards, and also because in practice the state uses
boilerplate approaches to working with families. See, e.g., Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or
Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 583
(1997); see also ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 79.
131. To be clear, I do not mean that the parents' rights doctrine should be abrogated for
such parents. But rather that these parents need more social and economic supports from the state
so that they can enjoy the same autonomy in decisionmaking afforded more economically stable
parents. I intend to explore this issue more fully in a separate article.
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rights create a win/lose mentality that fuels an adversarial process and an
adversarial relationship between parents and the state, rather than fostering
the true collaboration needed to address the difficult issues facing families.
Rights value autonomy, not assistance, and thus obscure the role of poverty.
The common conception of rights is that rights-bearers are "separate,
autonomous, and responsible individuals entitled to exercise rights and
obliged to bear liabilities for their actions.'' 12 This conception of rights does
not advance the interests of children in the child welfare system because
children simply do not benefit from this sort of autonomy. Although there is
certainly a range of capabilities among children, depending at least on age
and individual development, it is a truism that most children rely on adults
for their daily needs. They are not autonomous legally or practically.'
Perhaps surprisingly, adults involved in the child welfare system also
do not fall within, and are not served by, the dominant understanding of an
autonomous rights-bearing individual. As Jennifer Nedelsky argues, it is a
fundamental misconception of human nature to view individuals as wholly
separate from one another and from the state. Contending that the dominant
conception of rights is one-sided in its emphasis on individualism, rather
than relationships,' she identifies our dependency relationships-between
parents and children, students and teachers, and state and citizens-as
essential to fostering the real autonomy needed in a democratic society (the
ability to engage in the polity). "5 To Nedelsky, the question is how to
132. Minow, supra note 45, at 15; accord MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 47-75 (1991) (discussing the dominant paradigm of
the lone rights-bearing individual).
133. See Minow, supra note 45, at 18. Minow notes:
To the extent that the dominant conception of rights presumes both autonomy and a
direct relationship between the individual and the state, rights for children are even
more problematic than rights for adults. Conceptually and practically, children in our
society are not autonomous persons but instead dependents who are linked legally and
daily to adults entrusted with their care.
id.
134. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Rights as Relationships, 1 REV. CONST. STUDIES/REV.
D'ETUDES CONSTITUTIONNELLES 1, 7-8 (1993).
135. See id. As Nedelsky explains the relationship between rights and autonomy,
[t]here is the idea that rights are barriers that protect the individual from
intrusion by other individuals or by the state. Rights define boundaries others
cannot cross and it is those boundaries, enforced by the law, that ensure individual
freedom and autonomy. This image of rights fits well with the idea that the essence of
autonomy is independence, which thus requires protection and separation from others. My
argument is that this is a deeply misguided view of autonomy. What makes autonomy
possible is not separation, but relationship.
This approach shifts the focus from protection against others to structuring
relationships so that they foster autonomy. Some of the most basic presuppositions about
autonomy shift: dependence is no longer the antithesis of autonomy but a precondition
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structure rights such that they foster these autonomy-enhancing rela-
tionships."6 Nedelsky contends that the dominant conception of rights,
which is based on a model of "rights as trumps," '137 has limited utility for
advancing certain goals.' She urges instead a model of rights as relation-
ships, in which "we always try to get people to see the patterns of relationship
that a proposed law or interpretation will foster."'39 In the "rights as relation-
ship" model, rights are viewed as a means for structuring relationships, 4' and
thus rights should be formulated in a manner that fosters beneficial
relationships. 4' By unveiling "the relational consequences of certain forms of
rights," Nedelsky aims to help "people see how different policies or legal
interpretations will actually affect people and the ways they live together.'
42
Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon notes that the current conception of
rights, in which a lone, autonomous rights-bearer asserts an absolute right
to do as she pleases, ignores both relationships and responsibility.43  For
example, the motorcyclist who chooses not to wear a helmet because it is
her right to make her own choices about her body ignores the impact of an
injury on family, friends, and dependents, and on society through the cost
in the relationships-between parent and child, student and teacher, state and citizen-
which provides the security, education, nurturing, and support that make the develop-
ment of autonomy possible.
Id.
136. See id. at 8 ("The constitutional protection of autonomy is then no longer an effort to
carve out a sphere into which the collective cannot intrude, but a means of structuring the
relations between individuals and the sources of collective power so that autonomy is fostered
rather than undermined.").
137. Id. at 6-8, 14, 17-18 (discussing this model and noting origins of phrase in Ronald
Dworkin's work).
138. Jennifer Nedelsky, The Practical Possibilities of Feminist Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1286,
1295-96 (1993).
139. Id. at 1296. Nedelsky addresses the importance of framing arguments, noting the costs
of using available legal doctrines rather than creating institutions that could resolve "problems in
a genuinely feminist framework." Id. at 1287-89.
140. In Nedelsky's view, this is a descriptive rather than a normative statement. See Nedelsky,
supra note 134, at 13 ("[W]hat rights in fact do and have always done is construct relationships-of
power, of responsibility, of trust, of obligation.").
141. See Nedelsky, supra note 138, at 1289-90.
142. Id. at 1296, 1300. Martha Minow also has addressed the importance of relationships to
rights. She argues that the current conception of rights divides the world into winners and losers
and that in this act of dividing, we overlook relationships. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL
THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 1-4 (1990). She argues neither
for a wholesale abandonment of rights nor for business as usual. See id. at 15-16. Minow
acknowledges that a critical examination of rights is essential because legal rules enforce patterns
of private power, and thus the pressing question is "what relationships [do] existing rights establish
between the rights-bearing individual, the government, and other people? If a right protects
liberty, whose liberty does it protect and at what cost to whom?" Id. at 283.
143. See GLENDON, supra note 132, at 45-46.
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of medical care.' The dominant view of rights "promotes unrealistic
expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of com-
mon ground.""'4 And this has far-reaching effects: "Our simplistic rights
talk regularly promotes the short-run over the long-term, sporadic crisis
intervention over systemic preventive measures, and particular interests over
the common good."'46 For Glendon, it is not the existence of rights per se
that creates the problem, but rather the valorization of rights without
concomitant responsibilities.'47
Applying these insights to the child welfare system, it becomes appar-
ent that the dominant model of rights does little to protect the interests of
parent and child. The autonomy principle embodied in parents' rights and
preservationist children's rights is important in that it requires the state to
satisfy certain threshold criteria before intervening in the life of a family. 4
But the benefit of the autonomy principle may end there. I focus on the
point after child abuse and neglect has been identified and ask how the
state should address this abuse or neglect. I assume that there are real
problems facing poor families and that something should be done to address
these problems. Thus, it is not simply a question of asserting autonomy-
"state, go away"-but rather, once the state is present, ascertaining the
most beneficial relationship between the state and families. I believe this is
achieved by helping parents address the underlying causes of the abuse and
neglect. When rights are conceived as freedom from the state (the tradi-
tional concept of autonomy), the need of parents and children to receive
something from the state is obscured.
To elaborate, poor parents need the state. There is a widespread mis-
conception that the child welfare system intervenes only where there is
evidence of severe abuse and neglect. In reality, although such cases receive
tremendous publicity, they are not the norm, constituting approximately
10 percent of all cases.'49 By contrast, approximately 50 percent of all cases
involve poverty-related neglect,' which typically involves substance
144. See id.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 15.
147. See id. at 5, 45.
148. See supra note 30 (setting forth standards).
149. See WALDFOGEL, supra note 11, at 124-25 (citing a study finding that approximately
10 percent of the cases in the child welfare system involve child abuse and neglect warranting
criminal charges).
150. See id. at 125.
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abuse,"5' inadequate housing, ' or inappropriate child care arrangements.
(The remaining 40 percent fall somewhere in between, involving abuse or
neglect that is not considered severe and does not require intervention by the
criminal justice system but still rises above the level of poverty-related neglect. 4)
The correlation between poverty and involvement in the child welfare
system is striking.'5  Noted child welfare researcher Duncan Lindsey has
concluded that "[i]nadequacy of income, more than any other factor, con-
stitutes the reason that children are removed."'' 6  Negative changes in
income, especially when that income is derived from welfare benefits, have
been shown to increase levels of child welfare involvement.' A national
study of the incidence of abuse and neglect concluded that children from
families with incomes of less than $15,000 a year were forty-four times more
likely to be neglected than children from families with income levels at or
above $30,000.'58 The study concluded that the findings could not be
explained entirely by the supposition that "children in lower income families
151. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BLENDING PERSPECTIVES AND BUILDING
COMMON GROUND: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CHILD PROTECTION
ch. 4 (1999), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/subabuse99/subabuse.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2005)
("Most studies find that for between one third and two-thirds of children involved with the child
welfare system, parental substance abuse is a contributing factor. Lower figures tend to involve
child abuse reports and higher findings most often refer to foster care.").
152. At the extreme-inadequate housing that endangers children-housing problems can
lead to the removal of children. See, e.g., OREGON DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., FOSTER CARE
TRENDS 4 (2003) (finding that inadequate housing was a factor for 7.7 percent of children
entering foster care in Oregon). And inadequate housing is a major issue for returning children
placed in foster care to their biological parents. See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children:
Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1724 (2000) (citing a
study of D.C. foster care system that concluded 33-50 percent of the children in foster care could
be returned to their parents if the parents had adequate housing).
153. See WALDFOGEL, supra note 11, at 124-25.
154. See id. at 124. Although these categories are not perspicuous, distinctions among cases
can be made, and it is clear that only a small percentage of cases fall into the severe category.
155. See, e.g., LINDSEY, supra note 111 (finding that the major determinant of children's
removal from their parents' custody was not the severity of child maltreatment but unstable
sources of parental income); Christina Paxson & Jane Waldfogel, Work, Welfare, and Child
Maltreatment 1, 22-27 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7343, 1999)
(reporting their finding that "higher rates of poverty resulted in higher rates of substantiated
reports of abuse and neglect").
156. LINDSEY, supra note 111, at 175.
157. Paxson & Waldfogel, supra note 155, at 2; see also Kristen Shook, Does the Loss of Welfare
Income Increase the Risk of Involvement With the Child Welfare System? 12 (Joint Ctr. for Poverty
Research, Working Paper No. 65, 1999), available at http://www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/
shook.pdf?CFlD= 2761642&CFTOKEN =31487985 (documenting a study of welfare recipients in the
Chicago metropolitan area).
158. See ANDREA J. SEDLAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 5-50 (1996).
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more frequently come to the attention of... community professionals."'59
Using data from Illinois, California, and North Carolina, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services found that between 68 and
71 percent of children entering foster care had previously received federal
welfare benefits or had been part of the Medicaid program. 16°
Some states explicitly exempt poverty as a ground for a finding of
neglect, 6' but others do not.' Although the issues associated with poverty-
related neglect, such as substance abuse, poor housing, and inappropriate
child care, are serious problems, the child welfare system does not address
these underlying poverty issues." Rather, operating with limited resources,
the system preemptively removes children from their homes."6 For these
poverty-related neglect cases-again, half of all children in foster care-
studies have found that placement in foster care is not the proper
solution. 165  Instead, treating the underlying issues is a better approach.
Although substance abuse is difficult to treat, and relapse is highly likely, 66
159. Id. at 5-51.
160. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DYNAMICS OF CHILDREN'S MOVEMENT
AMONG THE AFDC, MEDICAID, AND FOSTER CARE PROGRAMS PRIOR TO WELFARE REFORM:
1995-1996, at 9 tbl. 1 (2000). A similar study was undertaken by the Joint Center for Poverty
Research. See Kristen Shook, Assessing the Consequences of Welfare Reform for Child Welfare,
POVERTY RES. NEWS (Northwestern Univ./Univ. of Chicago Joint Ctr. for Poverty Research),
Winter 1998, at 8 (describing a relationship between children who had received Aid to Families
with Dependent Children and placement in foster care).
161. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (Lexis 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.01(30)(f) (West 2005); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 2005).
162. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-201 (21) (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-180(5)(B)
(2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 26-8A-2(4) & (5) (2004). The studies finding that children are
removed due to poverty do not specify whether this happens only in states that permit such removals.
163. Typically, the case plan for the parent is a "pretyped, generic form[ I that obligate[s] the
mother to submit to drug tests, go to counseling, submit to psychological evaluations, attend
parenting classes, and visit the child." Appell, supra note 130, at 583.
164. See Buss, supra note 111, at 433-34; Cynthia R. Mabry, Second Chances: Insuring That
Poor Families Remain Intact by Minimizing Socioeconomic Ramifications of Poverty, 102 W. VA. L.
REV. 607, 616-24 (2000).
165. See LINDSEY, supra note 111, at 166; see also WALDFOGEL, supra note 11, at 78. 1 do
not mean to minimize the consequences of severe neglect. Indeed, severe neglect accounted for
35.6 percent of the 1500 abuse and neglect deaths in 2003. See CHILD MALTREATMENT, supra
note 17, at 55-56. Moreover, as Waldfogel notes, the poverty-related neglect cases are not
unimportant as some of them may be early warning signs of a situation that may escalate, or the
signs of minor maltreatment may reflect undetected chronic abuse or neglect. See WALDFOGEL,
supra note 11, at 125. But the question this Article asks is whether for the typical lower-risk case,
foster care is the appropriate "service" to help this family.
166. See Dennis M. Donovan, Relapse Prevention in Substance Abuse Treatment, in DRUG
ABUSE TREATMENT THROUGH COLLABORATION: PRACTICE AND RESEARCH PARTNERSHIPS
THAT WORK 121 (James L. Sorenson et al. eds., 2003). Donovan observes:
Relapse is a common outcome following the initiation of abstinence, whether the
abstinence was initially achieved with or without formal treatment. The rates of relapse
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housing supports can play a key role in helping parents break the cycle
of addiction and enabling them to care for their children again."'
To be sure, there are multiple, interrelated risk factors for child welfare
involvement, 16 and the connection between the factors and the involve-
ment is not always clear. For example, homelessness is a very strong predictor
of involvement in the child welfare system. Thirty-seven percent of families
who have had one instance of homelessness become involved (although do
not necessarily have their children removed) with the child welfare system,
as compared with 9 percent of low-income families who have homes.'
69
This pattern may reflect conditions related to homelessness, such as severe
poverty and domestic violence. It may be explainable by referrals to shelters
as part of service plans by child welfare agencies, or the greater scrutiny by
child protective services of families in shelters. Or it may simply flow from
the detrimental effect of homelessness on a parent's ability to raise a child
effectively, and the compromise to children's development flowing from the
upheaval of homelessness."'
associated with alcohol, cocaine, heroin, and other drugs of abuse are quite high, with
some estimates suggesting that 60% or more of individuals relapse after stopping their
substance use.
Id. (citation omitted); see also id. at 122 (noting that relapse is a natural and normal part of recovery).
167. See Hilary Waldman, A Second Chance as Mom: State Helps Troubled Parents Succeed by
Providing a Home, and Advice, HARTFORD COURANT, July 3, 2005, at Al (describing a
"Supportive Housing" program in Connecticut and early indications that permanent housing
makes all the difference to successful drug treatment).
168. See, e.g., Jocelyn Brown et al., A Longitudinal Analysis of Risk Factors for Child
Maltreatment: Findings of a 17-Year Prospective Study of Officially Recorded and Self-Reported Child
Abuse and Neglect, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 1065, 1070-72 (1998) (discussing risk factors for
abuse and neglect, and finding that different combinations of factors are associated with physical
abuse, sexual abuse, and neglect). Maternal sociopathy and maternal youth were associated with
all types of child maltreatment; poverty and large family size were strongly associated with neglect;
low maternal involvement, early separation from a mother, and perinatal problems were
associated with physical abuse; a child's gender and disability, a deceased parent, and living with a
stepfather were associated with sexual abuse. See id. at 1073. Additionally, this study demonstrates
that the greater the number of risk factors, the greater the likelihood for maltreatment. See id. at 1074
(finding that with no risk factors, the likelihood of maltreatment was only 3 percent; the presence
of four or more risk factors raised the likelihood of maltreatment to 24 percent). Finally, the study
concludes that low-income families may have higher rates of physical abuse and neglect (although
not sexual abuse) than families with greater income levels, and that this conclusion is not a result
of biased reporting, investigation, or substantiation. See id. at 1066, 1074.
169. See Jennifer F. Culhane et al., Prevalence of Child Welfare Services Involvement Among
Homeless and Low-Income Mothers: A Five-year Birth Cohort Study, 30 J. Soc. & SOC. WELFARE 79,
89-91 (2003). Another indicator was the number of children in the families: Among homeless
women, 24 percent of women with one child were involved in the child welfare system, whereas
54 percent of women with four children or more were involved with the child welfare system. See
id. at 92-93.
170. See id. at 91.
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 669 2005-2006
I do not mean to imply that poor parents have their children removed
simply because the parents are poor. Rather, my point is that poverty is a
fundamental underlying issue and that the state should address the deep-
seated problems associated with poverty, rather than "assisting" poor
parents by removing their children. The question is how best to address
these problems.
I believe a rights-based model of child welfare does not help parents or
children because the model obscures the real issue of poverty by placing a
premium on autonomy rather than assistance. Although a parent may wish
the state to leave her alone and let her raise her child, if she is unable to do
so because of poverty, then to truly exercise the right to the care and
custody of her child, she may need the assistance of the state.' 7' Similarly,
children also need something from the state, but not necessarily the
interventions they currently receive. The enforcement of protectionist
children's rights requires adult intervention-it is the right to receive
something rather than the right to be left alone. But what children
currently receive is, in most cases, not helpful because the intervention is
simply removal and placement in the foster care system (with its attendant
risks), rather than an attempt to address the underlying issues."
Rights create a zero-sum mentality, thus fostering an adversarial process and
adversarial relationships. The child welfare laws are designed to be
implemented in courts, which operate on the adversarial model. Thus, it is
not surprising that rights become the focus of court proceedings. As described
above, parents' rights and preservationist children's rights, on the one hand,
are pitted against protectionist children's rights, on the other, in a zero-sum
fashion.'73 The court becomes the distributor of rights, fueling a win/lose
171. I do not mean to imply that poor parents have no need for the rights of decisionmaking
that more affluent parents enjoy. Indeed, poor parents still need deference to their parental
decisionmaking. Thus, my claim may be better stated as one for autonomy and assistance. This
dual need is the subject of a future article.
172. The argument that society should help, not punish, poor parents is not new. As
Dorothy Roberts described in a recent article, after the Civil War, African American women, who
were excluded by white women from child-saving campaigns, created their own movement by forming
clubs and church groups designed to address the well-being of children. See Dorothy E. Roberts,
Black Club Women and Child Welfare: Lessons for Modern Reform, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 957-58
(2005). Instead of focusing on particular cases of abuse or neglect, this movement addressed the
well-being of all children, and also tried to support, rather than penalize, mothers, believing that
assisting mothers would assist the children. See id. at 958, 963-71.
173. See, e.g., Ross, supra note 61, at 176 ("In child welfare disputes, protections accorded to one
party--parent, state, child or foster parent--almost inevitably diminish the substantive interests of
another."). In this context I do not mean to include all rights, such as the right to present evidence or
receive notice of a hearing. Rather, my point is that the broader conception of rights-solicitude for
either the parent or the child, preservation or protection-presents a zero-sum situation.
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mentality among the parties. That most cases are not litigated does not
diminish this mentality as settlements are, of course, conducted in the
shadow of the rights-based system.
Setting aside the vast and rich literature written on this topic in the
field of alternative dispute resolution, and focusing only on the child welfare
system, it is clear that the adversarial process is a poor means for resolving
the issues facing families. As noted above, only about 10 percent of the cases
in the child welfare system involve severe abuse. In these cases, it is a fair
claim that the rights of a parent who has severely abused or neglected a child
and who wishes to retain custody of that child may be at odds with the right
of the child to a safe home. This situation likely does pit the right of the
parent squarely against certain rights of the child. In these relatively few
cases I do not argue that the conception of rights creates a conflict between
parent and child, but rather that there almost certainly is a conflict between
the rights of parent and child. This dispute may well be best settled in court
because the adversarial relationship between the parties is relatively clear.'74
But in the remaining cases, and in particular the approximately 50 percent of
poverty-related neglect cases, the substantive rights of parent and child are
not necessarily at odds with each other.
In less serious abuse and neglect cases, and especially in poverty-
related neglect cases, helping a parent address the economic, psychological,
and social issues that led to the abuse or neglect would help both parent
and child. Put another way, the traditional assumption that a parent will
act in her child's best interest cannot be truly tested without first helping
the parent, because she may not be able to act in her child's best interest
without substantial support from the state. For example, a parent may not
be able to afford adequate housing without a subsidy. But this inability to
provide adequate housing does not necessarily mean the parent is unwilling
to act in the child's best interest, rather that she needs help doing so. In
this way, the zero-sum orientation of the child welfare system obscures the
alignment of interests between parent and child.
Such alignment does exist. In the typical child welfare case, parents
and children share an interest in addressing the issues that led to the abuse
or neglect. This observation is not the simple conclusion that parents and
174. As noted in the Introduction, I am not here resolving this question. Rather, my intent
is to take these cases out of the equation in my attempt to determine the best legal model (and
process to implement that model) for the majority of cases in the child welfare system.
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 671 2005-2006
children share an interest in preventing unwarranted intervention,' 5 which
is certainly true, but rather that even where intervention is required, that is,
where there is some abuse or neglect, the interests of parent and child may
still be aligned. The parent has an interest in retaining custody of the
child, and the child has an interest in the parent receiving help such that
the child can remain safe and in the parent's home.
Thus, what is needed in the majority of cases is not an adversarial
proceeding, but rather a process that facilitates thoughtful group
collaboration among parents, children, and the state to address the
underlying issues related to the abuse and neglect. The rights-based model-
with its inevitable win/lose mentality-impedes this collaboration.'76
** *
There is a fundamental mismatch between rights as conceived and
implemented and the needs of parents and children. Thus, legal scholars
should not look to rights as the primary ground for reforming the child
welfare system. In the next part, I explore a model of child welfare that
would shift rights to the background and focus instead on the problems
facing families.
1II. A PROBLEM-SOLVING MODEL:
THE EXAMPLE OF FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING
Thus far I have described the rights-based model governing the child
welfare system and explored the considerable limitations of this model.
Because the current system-and the academic debate about how to fix it-is
175. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982) ("[U]ntil the State proves
parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship.").
176. On a related point, the individualist thinking fostered by rights does a disservice to
children by excluding a "family systems" orientation to resolving family problems. Long-espoused
by social workers, family systems theory proposes that the family is a living entity, with each part
dependent on the other. The only way fully to understand an individual is to look at her
in the context of her family and to understand the interaction of the family. See SALVADOR
MINUCHIN, FAMILIES AND FAMILY THERAPY 9 (1974); STEPHEN J. SCHULTZ, FAMILY SYSTEMS
THERAPY: AN INTEGRATION 16-17 (1984). To help a child, the whole family must be treated.
In the view of family systems theory, the clash between parents' rights and children's rights simply
misunderstands the problem: It is not a question of parent or child. Rather, the only possible
solution must involve parent and child. Cf. Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems Paradigm for Legal
Decision Making Affecting Child Custody, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1996) (discussing the
need for a family systems approach to resolving child custody disputes).
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so dominated by rights, other possible models are largely unexplored. But
an alternative model is needed because the solution to child welfare will
never be found solely in rights. A new model would acknowledge a parent's
need for assistance-thus creating a better frame for the issues facing families in
the child welfare system-and would foster collaboration, not adverseness,
between the state and families. It would be a problem-solving model.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow first coined the term "problem-solving
model," noting that it reflected a move in negotiation away from
adversarial, zero-sum thinking.'77 As she stated, a "problem-solving model
seeks to demonstrate how negotiators ... can more effectively accomplish
their goals by focusing on the parties' actual objectives and creatively
attempting to satisfy the needs of both parties, rather than by focusing
exclusively on the assumed objectives of maximizing individual gain.''7s As
Robert Mnookin and his coauthors state, "[alt its core, problem-solving
implies an orientation or mindset-it is not simply a bundle of
techniques." '79 In this Article, I use the term "problem-solving" both in the sense
it is used in the world of alternative dispute resolution, and also more generally
to describe a model of child welfare that focuses proactively on the
problems facing families, rather than on allocating blame for abuse and neglect.
A number of collaborative processes may satisfy the problem-solving
model, 80 but one in particular seems promising. Family group conferencing,
a radical departure from the adversarial process, has been used successfully
177. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 755-58 (1984).
178. Id. at 758; accord Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn't Everything: The Lawyer
as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 906 (2000) ("[Piroblem solving negotiation means
that the parties can do better than they might otherwise do, especially if they are employing an
unnecessarily unproductive adversarial approach.").
179. ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE
IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 315 (2000).
180. Indeed, many courts self-identify as problem-solvers, using an interdisciplinary approach
to the complex interaction of multiple problems, such as substance abuse, crime, and child abuse.
See, e.g., Judith S. Kaye, Changing Courts in Changing Times: The Need for a Fresh Look at How Courts
Are Run, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 851, 859-62 (1997). Kaye describes the Family Treatment Court in
Manhattan's family court system, in which
the court is no longer a remote adjudicator but is heading a problem-solving team. The
problem solving is on two levels. In any particular case, the court will be asking what do
we do to get this particular parent off drugs. But on a larger scale, the court will be
taking a leadership role in seeing that all the players-from Medicaid eligibility
specialists to private foster care agencies to drug treatment providers to child welfare
agency case-workers-work together.
Id.; see also Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The Potential of Model Family Courts, 2002 WiS.
L. REV. 331, 332-33, 367-74 (describing the successes of model courts, including the Manhattan
Family Treatment Court, but also noting the failure of such courts to focus on family integrity).
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in child welfare in a number of countries and embodies a problem-solving
approach to child welfare. To show concretely the problem-solving model
in practice, this part describes the theory and practice of family group
conferencing. I offer this discussion of family group conferencing as simply
one example of a collaborative process. My point is not that family group
conferencing is perfect, or that it is the only process that embodies a
problem-solving model of child welfare. Rather, I argue that family group
conferencing represents a different approach to child welfare than the
adversarial process born of the rights-based model, and that such
approaches are very promising.
A. Origins, the Process, and Theoretical Underpinnings
Family group conferencing' s' is part of the broader restorative justice
movement, which seeks to reform the justice system to incorporate victims and
to allow the offender to "restore" the status quo.'s2 Although largely focused on
criminal justice, the restorative justice movement has also addressed other
systems, including child welfare. In that context, family group conferencing is
the practice of convening family members, community members, and other
individuals or institutions involved with a family to develop a plan to
ensure the care and protection of a child who is at risk for abuse or neglect.'83
181. "Family group conferencing" is the term used in New Zealand. As the practice has spread
around the globe, alternative terms, and alternative practices, have emerged. For simplicity, this
Article uses the term family group conferencing.
182. Mark S. Umbreit, What Is Restorative Justice?, in CTR. FOR RESTORATIVE JUST. &
PEACEMAKING, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING: IMPLICATIONS FOR
CRIME VICTIMS 1 (2000); accord John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, Restorative Justice andFamily Violence, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE 1, 4 (Heather Strang & John
Braithwaite eds., 2002) ("The most general meaning of restorative justice is a process where
stakeholders affected by an injustice have an opportunity to communicate about the consequences of
the injustice and what is to be done to right the wrong."). But see Mike Doolan, Restorative
Practices and Family Empowerment: both/and or either/or?, FAMILY RIGHTS NEWSLETTER (2003),
available at http://fp.enter.net/restorativepractices/au05/au05-doolanl.pdf (challenging the idea
that family group conferencing is akin to restorative justice because the latter is focused on the
victim and restoring the harm, whereas the former is focused on empowering the family). Family
group conferencing differs from therapeutic jurisprudence, in which judges take a more active role in
the lives of litigants, such as ensuring that drug addicts are attending drug rehabilitation treatment
programs, rather than simply adjudicating guilt and innocence. By contrast, family group
conferencing seeks to avoid court involvement altogether. Family group conferencing also differs
from dependency mediation in that the latter concerns negotiations regarding matters pending
before a court. See Susan M. Chandler & Marilou Giovannucci, Family Group Conferences:
Transforming Traditional Child Welfare and Policy Practice, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 216, 217-18 (2004).
183. See Gale Burford & Joe Hudson, General Introduction: Family Group Conference
Programming, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING: NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMMUNITY-CENTERED
CHILD AND FAMILY PRACTICE, at xix (Gale Burford & Joe Hudson eds., 2000) [hereinafter
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 674 2005-2006
Rights Myopia in Child Welfare 675
Simplified descriptions of two cases, one receiving traditional child
welfare services and one receiving a family group conference, illustrate the
marked differences between the two approaches. In a child welfare case
under the current system, after the state agency receives a credible report of
child abuse or neglect sufficient to warrant removal, a caseworker goes to
the home and assesses the danger to the child. Assuming the caseworker
finds sufficient evidence of such danger, the caseworker removes the child
and places her in foster care pending a more thorough investigation. The
state agency then files a petition in court seeking temporary custody of the
child. The child is assigned a guardian ad litem to represent her interests.
The caseworker then develops a case plan for the parents, requiring the
parents to, for example, obtain drug treatment and attend parenting classes.
If the parents do not comply with this case plan within the specified period,
generally twelve to eighteen months, then the state agency files for a petition
for the termination of parental rights. If the court agrees that parental
rights should be terminated, the child is freed for adoption. The majority of
decisions in this model are made by professionals: caseworkers, therapists,
guardians ad litem, and judges.
In a family group conferencing case, the story and decisionmakers are
decidedly different."s4 In a typical family group conferencing case, after
receiving a report, a social worker conducts an initial investigation to
determine if there has been abuse or neglect. If the social worker concludes
there is evidence of abuse or neglect, she refers the case to a coordinator, who
has the authority to convene a family group conference. The coordinator
contacts the parents, the child,"s' extended family members, and significant
community members who know the family. Before the conference, each
potential conference participant meets separately with the coordinator to learn
about the process. In these meetings, the coordinator screens for potentially
FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING]. Although not addressed in this Article, family group
conferencing is also used for juvenile offenses. See Umbreit, supra note 182, at 2 (describing the
process for addressing crimes of juveniles).
184. The following description draws on a number of sources, including HARDIN ET AL., supra
note 12, at 3-5; Paul Adams & Susan M. Chandler, Building Partnerships to Protect Children: A
Blended Model of Family Group Conferencing, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 503, 505-06 (2002); Jolene M.
Lowry, Family Group Conferences as a Form of Court Approved Alternative Dispute Resolution in Child
Abuse and Neglect Cases, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 66-76, app. (1997); Allison Morris,
Children and Family Violence: Restorative Messages From New Zealand, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 182, at 89, 99-101; Barbara White Stack, CYF Program Allows
Mother to Take Fate Into Own Hands, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 20, 2003, at B1.
185. If the child is developmentally able to participate in the family group conference, the
coordinator will meet with the child. If the child is not able or willing to participate, the
coordinator will still at least see the child.
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complicating factors, such as a history of domestic violence,'86 to determine
whether the case is appropriate for family group conferencing and, if so, what
additional supports may be needed for the participants.
There are three stages of the conference. In the first stage, the
coordinator and any professionals involved with the family, such as
therapists, teachers, and the investigating social worker, explain the case to
the family. In the second stage, the coordinator and professionals leave the
room while the family and community members engage in private
deliberation. During the private deliberation, the participants acknowledge that
the child was abused or neglected and develop a plan to protect the child
and help the parents. After the participants reach an agreement, they
present the plan to the social worker and coordinator, who likely have
questions for the participants. Parents, custodians, social workers, and
coordinators can veto the plan produced by the conference and refer the
case to court. 87 In practice, this rarely occurs: The participants come to a
decision, and the social worker and coordinator accept the plan (perhaps
with a few changes) if it meets predetermined criteria. The coordinator
writes up the plan, sends it to all participants, and then sets a time for a
subsequent conference to assess developments in the case.
The plan typically includes a decision about the safety of the child,
including whether the child should be placed outside of the home for a
certain period of time, and, if so, with whom. If the child is placed outside
the home, she is almost invariably placed with a relative or other
conference participant. The plan also identifies the services and supports
needed by the parents. Finally, the plan determines which participants will
both help the family and also check in on a regular basis to ensure the child
is safe and the parents are complying with the plan.
As is apparent from this description, five principles characterize the
philosophy of family group conferencing. First, children are raised best in their
own families. Second, families have the primary responsibility for caring for
their children, and these families should be supported, protected, and respected.
Third, families are able to make reliable, safe decisions for their children, and
families have strengths and are capable of changing the problems in their lives.
Fourth, families are their own experts, with knowledge and insight into which
186. For a discussion of domestic violence and family group conferencing, see infra notes
235-238 and accompanying text.
187. This is the New Zealand model. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 4 ("A number of
people have the legal right to veto the family's decision. This group includes parents, custodians,
social workers, care and protection coordinators, and children's lawyers.").
676
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solutions will work best for them. Finally, to achieve family empowerment,
families must have the freedom to make their own decisions and choices.88
As one of its proponents has stated, "[flamily group conferences
amount to a partnership arrangement between the state, represented by
child protection officials; the family; and members of the community, such
as resource and support persons; with each party expected to play an
important role in planning and providing services necessary for the well-
being of children."'89 Family group conferences are not a means for child
protection officials to relinquish their responsibilities, but rather are a
different method for exercising those" responsibilities. The intent is to strike
a balance between the interests of child protection and family support. Family
group conferencing represents a radical reorientation of child protection:
Many child protection approaches attempt to enforce community
standards (accountability) but lack any way for the community to
reach out and weave the family back into the community fabric with
the development of shared, voluntary commitments to community
standards. Consequently, those strategies often create short-term
relief, but do not change behavior in the long term. Those strategies
also rely heavily on outside enforcers, the professional system, to
solve the problem.' 90
Family group conferencing originated with the Maori and other First
Nations around the world, and New Zealand was the first country to
incorporate the process into its laws.' To avoid the removal of Maori children
188. Donald N. Duquette, Non-adversarial Case Resolution, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND
PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT,
AND DEPENDENCY CASES 354 (Marvin Ventrell & Donald N. Duquette eds., 2005).
189. See Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at xix.
190. Kay Pranis, Conferencing and the Community, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra
note 183, at 40, 44. One of the premises of family group conferencing is that families involved in
the child welfare system do better when they have input into the decisions affecting them. See
Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at x. Family group conferences "are predicated on the belief
that, given the right information and resources, families will make better decisions for themselves
than professionals .... The approach attempts to change the relationships between families and
professionals, moving families from passive recipients of 'professional wisdom' to front-line
decision-makers for their children." See Paul Nixon, Building Community Through Family Group
Conferences: Some Implications for Policy and Practice, in AM. HUMANE ASS'N, 1999 FAMILY
GROUP DECISION MAKING NATIONAL ROUNDTABLE PROCEEDINGS AND INTERNATIONAL
EVALUATION CONFERENCE: SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 3, 3 (1999). Some proponents make
even broader claims, contending that family group conferencing "is a process for acknowledging
and then transforming conflict within and between people." David Moore & John McDonald,
Guiding Principles of the Conferencing Process, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183,
at 49, 49 (emphasis omitted).
191. See Mike Doolan & Pam Phillips, Conferencing in New Zealand, in FAMILY GROUP
CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 193.
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to non-Maori families, and to incorporate Maori traditions of involving
extended family members in decisionmaking, legislative changes were made
to New Zealand's child welfare system in the Children, Young Persons, and
Their Families Act of 1989.192 The changes were in response to several
government reports documenting discrimination against Maori families in
the child welfare system.9  The legislative changes were not limited to
Maori families. Rather, the law required that all substantiated cases of child
abuse and neglect be referred for family group conferencing. 94 The premises
of family group conferences resonated with the idea, long-espoused by social
workers, "that lasting solutions to problems are ones that grow out of, or can fit
with, the knowledge, experiences, and desires of the people most affected."'9
There are four hallmarks of the family group conferencing process (and
these hallmarks reflect the principles set forth above). 196 First, the process is
intended to find and build on a family's strengths, rather than to place
blame. 97 One method for achieving this is to focus on the problem, rather
than the person, and to concentrate on healing.99 Although the current
system is supposed to preserve families, in practice social workers often do
not look for the strengths in a family and instead focus on the dysfunctional
192. See Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act of 1989 § 428, 1989 S.R. No. 24 (N.Z.);
Doolan & Phillips, supra note 191, at 193-97.
193. Catherine Love, Family Group Conferencing: Cultural Origins, Sharing, and Appropriation-A Maori Reflection, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 15, 15-16; see also
HARDIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 5 ("As in the United States, a very disproportionate number of
children involved in the New Zealand child welfare system have non-European origins.").
194. Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act of 1989 §§ 17-18.
195. Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at xxiii.
196. These hallmarks are not unique to family group conferencing and are found in many
alternative dispute resolution and problem-solving processes. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL.,GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 17-39 (2d ed. 1991)(discussing the need to focus on the problem, not the person); Jeanne M. Brett, Culture and
Negotiation, 35 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. 97 (2000) (describing the importance of incorporating the
relevant culture and values of participants); Lawrence E. Suskind, Consensus Building and ADR:Why They Are Not the Same Thing, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 361-62(Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (describing a consensus-building approach
to problem-solving as one that is more inclusive than court-based procedures, which include only
the parties themselves, not all the stakeholders).
197. See Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 182, at 219; Linda Richardson, Family Group
Decision Making: Transforming the Child Welfare System by Empowering Families and Communities, in
AM. HUMANE ASS'N, supra note 190, at 39, 39-40.
198. Pranis, supra note 190, at 42-44; Rupert Ross, Searching for the Roots of Conferencing, inFAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 5, 12 ("Relational justice tries to move [awayfrom stigmatizing a perpetrator], to convince people that they are more than their antisocial acts,
that they can learn how to respond in better ways to the pressures that affect them day to day.").It is this aspect of family group conferencing, and, more broadly, restorative justice, that often causes
advocates for women and children concern. See infra notes 234-238 and accompanying text.
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elements.'99 Thus, family group conferencing facilitates a strengths-based
practice because it requires the family and community to look within to
find solutions.2"0 Second, the process respects and values important cultural
practices of the relevant community.2"' Third, the process involves the
extended family and community."' Those individuals with information to
share, individuals who love the child, and individuals with a stake in the
outcome are all included in the conference.2"3 Finally, the process views
the community as a resource for the family.0
In addition to the four hallmarks of family group conferencing, there are
several key features of the process that set it apart from other alternative
dispute resolution methods and are essential for its success. These key elements
include sufficient preparation of the participants by the coordinator (often a
total of thirty-five hours of preparation per conference20 5), private family time
199. For example, in Alabama, biological parents brought a class-action lawsuit challenging
that state's child welfare practices because the state did not do enough to help families or protect
children from abuse or neglect. The parties agreed to a settlement in 1991 requiring Alabama to
completely reform its child welfare system. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW,
MAKING CHILD WELFARE WORK: HOW THE R.C. LAWSUIT FORGED NEW PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECT
CHILDREN AND SUSTAIN FAMILIES 5 (1998); Erik Eckholm, Once Woeful, Alabama Is Model in
Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at Al. The consent decree required the state to
provide services based on the strengths of children and parents and that families be preserved
whenever possible. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra, at 51. One of the
major barriers to this change was overcoming the views of the social workers, who were used to
perceiving deficits, not strengths, in biological families. See id.
200. See Lowry, supra note 184, at 65-66; Richardson, supra note 197, at 39-40; Robert
Victor Wolf, Promoting Permanency: Family Group Conferencing at the Manhattan Family Treatment
Court, 4 J. CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILD. & CTS. 133, 134 (2003).
201. See Ross, supra note 198, at 5.
202. See Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 182, at 219.
203. As one practitioner stated, "anybody who's going to be involved-or be an obstacle-
in planning for the children" should attend the conference. See Wolf, supra note 200, at 137.
Although community may be an amorphous concept, proponents of family group conferencing
contend that such ambiguity does not present a problem in practice. For example, Kay Pranis
contends that
[mIuch has been written about the meaning of "community" and lack of clarity is often
cited as a problem, which must be solved before we can proceed to work with communities.
Practical experience demonstrates otherwise. Communities themselves do not worry much
about academic definitions. They soon define themselves based on the issue at hand.
Pranis, supra note 190, at 40. This inclusiveness overlaps with Woodhouse's model of generism, which
grants parental rights to individuals who have established their ability and desire to take responsibility
for a child, rather than relying on mere biology. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
204. Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 182, at 219.
205. See Lisa Merkel-Holguin, Diversions and Departures in the Implementation of Family
Group Conferencing in the United States, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at
224, 224-25 (finding that adequate preparation for conferences is essential and that this typically
involves twenty-two to thirty-five hours of work for the coordinator).
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without professionals present, consensus on the plan, and monitoring
and follow-up by the conference participants and the state.2°
Although no country other than New Zealand requires the use of
family group conferencing, many countries have started to experiment with
it.2 7 In the United States, child welfare agencies have been experimenting
with family group conferencing since the early 1990s."' Although its use is
by no means widespread, states and localities are using some version of it with
increasing frequency.2" Notably, in the United States, social workers, rather
than lawyers and legislators, have pushed for its adoption."
B. Early Empirical Research
Studies on programs implemented around the world and in the United
States demonstrate that family group conferencing has had substantial
success in improving child welfare systems." ' First, studies suggest, but are
206. See Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Widening the Circle: Family Group Decisionmaking, 9 J.
CHILD & YOUTH CARE 1, 8-9 (1994); Laura Mirsky, Family Group Conferencing Worldwide: Part
One in a Series, RESTORATIVE PRACTICES EFORUM, Feb. 20, 2003, at 1, available at
http://iirp.org/library/fgcseries01.html (last visited Dec. 15, 2005).
207. See, e.g., PETER MARSH & GILL CROW, FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES IN CHILD
WELFARE (Olive Stevenson ed., 1998) (discussing family group conferencing in Great Britain);
Paul Ban, Family Group Conferences in Four Australian States, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING,
supra note 183, at 232; Knut Sundell, Family Group Conferences in Sweden, in FAMILY GROUP
CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 198.
208. See Wolf, supra note 200, at 134-35. There are three main types of "family
involvement" programs in the U.S., each falling along a continuum from simple involvement to
complete empowerment. First, a form of family group conferencing that very closely resembles the
New Zealand model, as of 2003 had been adopted in hundreds of communities in thirty-four
states. See Lisa Merkel-Holguin & Leslie Wilmot, Analyzing Family Involvement Approaches, in
WIDENING THE CIRCLE: THE PRACTICE AND EVALUATION OF FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING
WITH CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND THEIR FAMILIES 186 (Joan Pennell & Gary Anderson eds., 2005).
Second, family team conferencing, first begun in Alabama as a result of a lawsuit challenging child
welfare practices, involves family members as part of a team to make decisions. See id. at 186-87.
Although the family members do not have private family time, as in family group conferencing,
the practice is reported to offer meaningful involvement for the family. See id. Finally, team
decisionmaking offers families the opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, although without
the level of involvement as the other two models provide. The extended family is not necessarily
involved, and one of the main goals is bringing in a variety of professionals to ensure that the
social worker is not making a decision alone. See id.
209. See Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at xxiv; Merkel-Holguin, supra note 205, at 224
(reporting that in 1995, approximately five communities used family group conferencing; by 1999,
over one hundred communities used it); Larry Graber et al., Family Group Decision-Making in the
United States: The Case of Oregon, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY
AND PRACTICE 180 (J. Hudson et al. eds., 1996).
210. See Lowry, supra note 184, at 83.
211. See, e.g., Gary R. Anderson & Peg Whalen, Identifying Short-Ten and Long-Term FGC
Outcomes, in WIDENING THE CIRCLE, supra note 208, at 134-36; CAROL LUPTON & PAUL NIXON,
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not uniform in concluding, that families who participate in family group confer-
ences have lower levels of subsequent abuse and neglect than the typical child
welfare case. 12 This may be due in part to the way family group conferences
enlist family members in monitoring the safety and welfare of children."3
Second, research indicates that in the vast majority of cases families are
able to devise a plan for the care and protection of their children.' Family
members, including fathers, participate in numbers far greater than in the
traditional child welfare model.21s Caseworkers report that the plans devised
EMPOWERING IN PRACTICE? A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCE
APPROACH 119-37, 155-77 (1999); CAROL LUPTON ET AL., UNIV. OF PORTSMOUTH, FAMILY
PLANNING: AN EVALUATION OF THE FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCE MODEL 43-68, 105-19
(1995); MARSH & CROW, supra note 207, at 96. For a good discussion of the challenges of
evaluating alternative processes like family group conferencing and the importance of doing so, both
to the practice of family group conferencing and for persuading policymakers to adopt family
group conferencing, see Gordon Bazemore & Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Restorative Conferencing and
Theory-based Evaluation, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 284. Of course it
is possible that selection bias played a role in the generally positive outcomes described in these
studies. But this is not a risk in New Zealand, where family group conferencing is mandated for all
child welfare cases and thus where a "cherry picking" phenomenon is highly unlikely.
212. See Nancy Shore et al., Long Term and Immediate Outcomes of Family Group
Conferencing in Washington State, RESTORATIVE PRACTICES EFORUM, Sept. 10, 2002, at 1, available
at http://fp.enter.net/restorativepractices/fgcwash.pdf. Shore reports:
Children who had a conference experienced high rates of reunification or kinship placement,
and low rates of re-referral to CPS. These findings generally remained stable as long as two
years post-conference. This study, the longest long-term follow-up study of FGC published to
date, suggests that FGCs can be an effective planning approach for families involved with the
public child welfare agency, resulting in safe, permanent plans for children at risk.
Id.; Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Family Group Decision Making: Protecting Women and Children,
79 CHILD WELFARE 131, 145-47 (2000) (finding a decrease in abuse and neglect after a family
group conference: The number of events triggering intervention declined from 233 to 117 for
participating families; by contrast, nonparticipating families experienced an increase in triggering
events from 129 to 165); see also Charles E. Wheeler & Sabrina Johnson, Evaluating Family Group
Decision-making, The Santa Clara Example, PROTECTING CHILDREN: FGDM RESEARCH AND
EVALUATION (Am. Humane Ass'n, Denver, CO), 2003, at 65, 68; Nat. Council of Juvenile &
Family Court Judges, Empowering Families in Child Protection Cases: An Implementation Evaluation
of Hawaii's 'Ohana Conferencing Program, 7 TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BULL., Apr. 2003. But see
Knut Sundell & Bo Vinnerljung, Outcomes of Family Group Conferencing in Sweden: A 3-Year
Follow-Up, 28 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 267, 282-83 (2004) (noting higher rates of re-referral
for child welfare agencies following a family group conference than comparison group, but also
noting multiple explanations for higher rates).
213. See HARDIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 87 ("[T]he coordinators felt that family group
conferences can enhance the safety of the child because they set up more whistleblowers who can
be involved with the family far more frequently than any professionals.").
214. See Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at xxi.
215. See William Vesneski & Susan Kemp, The Washington State Family Group Conference
Project, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 312, 315; Shore et al., supra note
212, at 5 (noting that in service plans, 80 percent of parents mentioned mental health
services, 61 percent mentioned substance abuse treatment or prevention, 61 percent mentioned
behavioral interventions [anger management, domestic violence services, parenting, and stress
management classes], and 30 percent mentioned housing resources).
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by the participants often require more of the parent than the agency
typically would. Conference participants play an active role in
finding a solution for the troubles facing the family by providing, for
example, child care, home furnishings, transportation, housing, and
help with managing the household. 27 Although participating family members
have multiple problems, including substance abuse and histories of
violence, these participants are able to create thoughtful and detailed plans
to keep the children safe. 2 8  These plans draw on familial and
professional resources. 219 An evaluation of a Washington project demonstrated
that the family group conferences resulted in detailed plans drawing on
the families' expertise about their children and their own resources.
The plans also drew on social service supports, but as requested and
defined by the families. To use the vernacular of family group con-
ferencing, the process and results were "family-centered." ' The con-
ferences were based on a "strengths-based practice," focusing not on pathology
and dysfunction, but rather on resilience and potential for development
and success.22'
Third, participants report satisfaction with the process and result.2
For example, one mother described her experience as follows:
There comes a time when you think "I can take control now" and
that's when I think the normal way of running social services
departments falls down. Yes people come initially because they
do need a certain amount of support and a certain amount of
help. But if you go on trying [to] nursemaid and suffocate that
person then their growth isn't going to take place. The social
services, the way it's run at the moment actually doesn't allow
the person who has to ... take control, they're very reluctant to
give that person back the control of the family. So social services
becomes the head of the family, and the mother and the father, or one
of them, becomes more or less like a child themselves, and they regress
into no responsibility, because they're instructed all the way, what
216. See McElroy & Goodsoe, supra note 12, at 5-6.
217. See Richardson, supra note 197, at 45.
218. See Vesneski & Kemp, supra note 215, at 315, 318.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 315-19.
221. See id. at 320-22.
222. See Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at xxi. For example, an evaluation of the
Arizona Department of Economic Security's Family Group Decision Making program reported
that 94 percent of respondents expressed satisfaction with the process and outcome immediately
following the meeting. See ARIZ. DEP'T OF ECON. SEC., FAMILY GROUP DECISION MAKING:
THIRD ANNUAL EVALUATION REPORT 2 (2003).
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their responsibilities are. But they are not actually helped to rebuild
their confidence to enable them to take up the full responsibility.1
23
Fourth, there is evidence that family group conferencing fosters
development of a strong support network within the child's extended family
and community. For example, when the plan does recommend placement
outside of the immediate family, children are more often placed with
extended family members."4 In the Washington project, 77 percent of
children who were placed outside of the home as a result of the family group
conference were placed with relatives, whereas only 27 percent of children
not in family group conferencing but in need of out-of-home placement
were placed with relatives." 5 In New Zealand, 95 percent of all children
who are removed from their homes are placed with a relative. 6 The process
also fosters stronger ties between the family and the community. Research
has demonstrated that ties to the community are particularly important to
help an at-risk child overcome difficult family circumstances and that
emotional support outside of the immediate family can be a crucial protective
factor for children who grow up in high-risk environments.227
Finally, to the extent the process prevents the placement of children
in the foster care system, it could well generate significant savings for
223. MARSH & CROW, supra note 207, at 169-70.
224. See Burford & Hudson, supra note 183, at xxi.
225. See Vesneski & Kemp, supra note 215, at 319-20.
226. See Margaret Zack, Program Will Try to Place Abused Kids With Relatives-It Aims to Cut
Time in Shelter or Foster Care, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), July 6, 1999, at lB.
227. See Emmy E. Werner, Children of the Garden Island, Scl. AM., Apr. 1989, at 106 [hereinafter
Werner, Garden Island]. A thirty-year study of 698 infants on the Hawaiian island of Kauai
demonstrated the importance of the community to such children. See id. at 106, 108-10; Emmy E.
Werner, High-Risk Children in Young Adulthood: A Longitudinal Study From Birth to 32 Years, 59 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 72, 74 (1989) [hereinafter Werner, High-Risk Children]. The two principal
goals of the study were "to assess the long-term consequences of prenatal and perinatal stress and
to document the effects of adverse early rearing conditions on children's physical, cognitive and
psychosocial development." Werner, Garden Island, supra, at 106. The study evaluated the
children both during the prenatal period and then after birth at ages one, two, ten, eighteen, and
thirty-two. See id. One-third of the children were classified as high-risk because of exposure to
perinatal stress and other factors such as poverty, an uneducated parent, an alcoholic or mentally
ill parent, or divorce. See id.; Werner, High-Risk Children, supra, at 73. Despite these stressful
events, one out of three of the children in the high-risk category developed into competent,
caring adults. See Werner, Garden Island, supra, at 108; Werner, High-Risk Children, supra, at 73.
The research indicated that emotional support outside of the immediate family greatly contributed
to their resiliency. See Werner, Garden Island, supra, at 108-10; Werner, High-Risk Children, supra,
at 74. While growing up, these children had at least one close friend, they relied on kin,
neighbors, teachers, or church groups for support, and they participated in extracurricular
activities. See Werner, Garden Island, supra, at 108-10; Werner, High-Risk Children, supra, at 74.
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federal, state, and local governments.228 In fiscal year 2002, the total cost of
child welfare spending from federal, state, and local government sources was
$22.2 billion.29  Of this amount, $10 billion was spent on out-of-home
placements.230 Family group conferencing could incorporate poverty-related
programs already in place that are more cost-effective than foster care. For
example, Connecticut has been experimenting with a Supportive Housing
program in which the state partners with a private social services agency to
provide both permanent housing and intensive social services to rebuild
families. In one illustrative case, a mother had six children in foster care, at
a total cost to the state of $60,000. Once provided permanent housing and
intensive supports, she was able to regain custody of her children and keep
them out of foster care. The cost of this program was $11,000 for the
support services and approximately $5500 for the housing.23 '
Of course, the economic benefits of family group conferencing present a
complex issue. For example, relatives caring for children in the current system
still receive foster care payments from the state. To the extent children are
placed with relatives through a family group conference, presumably such
payments would continue. Additionally, the services requested from the family
group conference come with their own substantial price tag. My intent here is
not to conduct a definitive cost-benefit analysis of family group conferencing
versus traditional child welfare services, but rather simply to raise the point that
228. A tentative analysis of family group conferencing in the United Kingdom postulated
that there were "probable" or "possible" savings for the state in using family group conferences, due to
reduced court costs, lower re-abuse rates, and more stable placements. See MARSH & CROW, supra
note 207, at 172; see also Chandler & Giovannucci, supra note 182, at 222. Chandler and
Giovannucci note:
The child placement data from Minnesota and Arizona for those cases where the FGC
was used seems to point to a trend whereby children's out-of-home placements are either
less restrictive or avoided entirely. From this information, one could deduce that a
reduction in overall cost to the child welfare system for placement-related services might
offset the costs associated with an FGC program. Further analysis is likely to assist and
inform programs in demonstrating these cost benefits.
Id.
229. See CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE COST OF PROTECTING VULNERABLE
CHILDREN IV: HOW CHILD WELFARE FUNDING FARED DURING THE RECESSION 6 (2004).
230. See id. at 10.
231. See Waldman, supra note 167. Although reports do not describe the cost of the
housing voucher, the average subsidy costs the federal government $457 per month, see OFFICE OF
POL'Y DEV. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., COSTS AND UTILIZATION IN
THE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM 34 (2003), for a total cost of $5484. See also
INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON SUPPORTIVE HOUSING AND HOMELESSNESS, REPORT TO THE HON.
M. JODI RELL, GOV., STATE OF CONN. 4 (2005) (describing the cost of Supportive Housing versus
alternatives, and noting the connection between homelessness and foster care placement).
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vast sums of money are spent on the current child welfare system, but with
very poor results. The question is how better to allocate these resources.
Despite these five successes of family group conferencing, there are
important criticisms of the theory and the appropriateness of the process.
First, one concern is whether a family challenged by tough issues can make
its own decisions. Advocates of family group conferencing contend that
there are healthy parts of families traditionally labeled dysfunctional, and
functioning conference participants, found in the extended family or
community, can help the family make decisions."' If the community is
dysfunctional as well, the coordinator can bring in members from a larger
community where there are resources.' In this way, family group con-
ferencing is able to adapt to each family's decisionmaking abilities.
Second, scholars have identified process concerns for women in
alternative dispute resolution settings, noting, for example, that the flexibility
and lack of legal constraints can recreate existing power imbalances.234 Of
particular concern is a victim of domestic violence, who, through an alternative
dispute resolution process, may be required to interact, or, worse,
compromise, with her batterer. In the context of family group conferencing,
there is considerable disagreement on the propriety of the process when there
is a history of domestic violence. New Zealand mandates its use for all cases,
including those with a history of domestic violence, and some experts support
this practice, arguing that with proper protections for the victim, family group
conferencing can work effectively.35 Other experts, however, view family
232. Moore & McDonald, supra note 190, at 50.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
L.J. 1545, 1555-1607 (1991); see also Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and
the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 454-56 (1992). Bryan states:
Research on marital negotiations shows that the greater income and education and the
higher occupational level of husbands, compared to wives, confers upon husbands greater
power over routine decisions .... [U]nless the mediator intervenes, the husband's greater
tangible resources will grant him the lion's share of power in divorce negotiations,
particularly over critical financial issues.
Id. Of course we should be mindful of these critiques. Nonetheless, family group conferencing
still holds considerable promise, especially for those women who currently have very little voice in
the typical, adversarial child welfare proceeding. See supra text accompanying notes 111-116
(discussing practical problems with poor counsel and cursory legal proceedings).
235. See, e.g., Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Family Group Decision-Making and Family
Violence, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING, supra note 183, at 171. John Braithwaite has
asserted that "court processing of family violence cases actually tends to foster a culture of denial,
while restorative justice fosters a culture of apology," and that an apology, "when communicated
with ritual seriousness, is actually the most powerful cultural device for taking a problem seriously,
while denial is a cultural device for dismissing it." John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Social
Justice, 63 SASK. L. REV. 185, 189 (2000).
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group conferencing as being appropriate only "as a final step in a limited
number of domestic violence cases ... after safety mechanisms are first set
in place that can be enforced through court sanctions" and that "for the
incidence of domestic violence to be curtailed, clear and unambiguous
messages must be given by our legal system that such violence is wrong. ' 1 6
Although protections offered by legal representation are absent in family
group conferencing, there are advocates for women and children within the
conference. "Support persons" are identified by the coordinator for both
adult and child victims and these persons are supposed to protect victims
who are emotionally and physically vulnerable."' Additionally, in some
programs, lawyers, guardians ad litem, and court-appointed special
advocates participate in the conference.23 s
Third, there is a debate about the types of cases appropriate for family
group conferencing. New Zealand has determined that all cases of child
abuse and neglect are appropriate for family group conferencing, but some
countries have chosen not to use it for cases involving child sexual abuse.239
The argument against addressing child sexual abuse in a family group
conference is that the dynamics of sexual abuse can run across generations
and reflect a deep denial within the family, thus undercutting the ability of
family members in the conference to acknowledge the abuse and adequately
protect the child.4' On the other hand, there may be some role for family
236. Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice Initiatives: Who Pays if We Get It
Wrong?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 182, at 223-24. Busch
argues that safety, not reconciliation, should be the primary goal, see id., and that "[tihere are
grave risks in assuming that all relationship conflicts can be patched by consensus. Since the
consensual resolution of conflict requires an attitude of 'give a little, take a little' to reach an
agreement, there are risks in translating these principles unthinkingly into relationships affected
by violence." Id. at 228. However, Busch commends the Pennell and Burford model for
its emphasis on protection of victims through extensive pre-conference preparation,
through ensuring that victims will not be isolated or silenced during conference, the
researchers' willingness to use the criminal justice system's protections when necessary, their
commitment to ongoing monitoring and evaluation of families who have been through the
conferencing process-these demonstrate that restorative justice processes may be useful
in some domestic violence cases, at a late stage, after safety issues have been dealt with, in
conjunction with other measures also aimed at providing safety and autonomy for victims.
Id. at 246-47.
237. See Merkel-Holguin, supra note 205, at 227; Gale Burford et al., Measures to Ensure the
Safety of Family Members Participating in the Family Group Decision Making Project, in MANUAL FOR
COORDINATORS AND COMMUNITIES: THE ORGANIZATION AND PRACTICE OF FAMILY GROUP
DECISION MAKING 91 (1995). Some communities also offer support persons for offenders.
238. See Merkel-Holguin, supra note 205, at 227.
239. See id. at 225.
240. See id.
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group conferencing in cases of child sexual abuse,24' although it is important
to note that child sexual abuse cases differ radically from the typical abuse or
neglect case."'
Family group conferencing holds great potential for the child welfare
system. Although it may be no panacea for the very difficult issues facing the
system, the relevant question is whether family group conferencing, and a
problem-solving model more generally, is a marked improvement over the
current legal framework, which clearly is not serving the interests of parents
or children.
IV. BEYOND THE MYOPIA OF RIGHTS
The basic interests underlying rights-that the state should not
intervene in a family absent a showing of parental unfitness, and that children
should be safe in their homes-should be retained in any legal model. But
these interests are best protected by shifting our focus from rights to problem-
solving. We should stop calibrating the proper balance between parents' rights
and children's rights, and instead move beyond a fixation on rights as the savior
of parents and children. In particular, I argue that we should pull decision-
making authority away from distributors of rights, that is, the courts, and put it
back in the hands of families and communities. A problem-solving model
would protect the substantive interests of both parents and children by moving
away from a process where rights dominate and focusing, in the vast majority of
cases, on how to help parents overcome the underlying issues that led to the
abuse and neglect. The family group conferencing process exemplifies
241. Some advocates contend that the offender apologizing to the victim, and the victim
having the opportunity to tell the offender about her experience of the offense, can help heal
sexual abuse. See Terry S. Trepper, The Apology Session, in TREATING INCEST: A MULTIPLE
SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 93 (Terry S. Trepper & Mary Jo Barrett eds., 1986); see also HARDIN ET
AL., supra note 12, at 22-23. Hardin writes:
[T]here are at least two major reasons for using family group conferences in all sexual
abuse cases. The first is that the mother should not be left alone to protect the child and
to decide whether or not to side with the father against the child. Second, there should
be more rigor in making sure that all family members are properly informed about the
nature of the situation, [and thus protected from the perpetrator].
Id. Moreover, distinguishing cases presents difficulties because some cases that appear to present
"only" physical abuse or neglect may well involve sexual abuse as well, a fact that comes to light
during the process. See Gale Burford & Joan Pennell, Family Group Decision Making: New Roles
for 'Old' Partners in Resolving Family Violence: Implementation Report Summary 19 (Memorial Univ.
of Newfoundland, Inst. Soc. & Econ. Research 1996).
242. See supra note 19 (discussing the distinct characteristics of sexual abuse).
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the problem-solving model of child welfare. It is clear that such a
model has significant advantages over the current rights-based model.
A. Benefits of the Problem-solving Model
A problem-solving model for the child welfare system does not
abandon the interests underlying parents' rights and children's rights-the
interest in family integrity and being free from abuse and neglect. These
substantive interests still lie at the heart of the child welfare system. But
the process for protecting these interests is not cast in terms of rights. As
the rhetoric of rights recedes, the specific procedures designed to protect
the interests are relinquished in favor of a more fluid process. In the
problem-solving model, the first question is how to meet the needs of and
safeguard the child as well as support the parents. In this way, the model
does not assume a conflict between preservation and protection. Rather,
the task is to widen the lens and see who has a role in creating the problem
and who can help resolve it.
As a first step, and as discussed above, it is important to distinguish among
the types of cases in the child welfare system, separating the approximately
10 percent of egregious cases from the remaining 90 percent of cases.243 This
filtering would lead to a better allocation of the limited resources in the child
welfare system. The state could focus its investigative resources on the
egregious cases, and the court system could target its limited resources
appropriately. If a family court had to reach decisions in only 10 percent of its
current caseload, the court could devote the necessary time to determining the
best outcome for these families. Not only would judges be focused, but limited
resources, such as adequate counsel for parents, would be more available. Thus
narrowed, in these egregious cases, the rights of parents and children would be
better protected in practice. After segregating the egregious cases, the
problem-solving approach could be adopted for the remaining cases. I now
turn to a detailed discussion of the benefits of the problem-solving model.
243. See Ross, supra note 61, at 192 (discussing the need to distinguish cases with "a more
sensitive filtering system, in which neglect that does not result in serious harm or danger would
trigger benefits in the form of services, rather than potentially unwarranted removal"). This
segregation builds on the relatively new practice in child welfare of "differential response."
Recognizing that cases vary and thus that different responses are appropriate for different cases,
this practice uses an "assessment-oriented approach" for those cases where abuse and neglect are
suspected or known, but are considered less severe; for cases of severe abuse and neglect, the
traditional investigative (and adversarial) process is used. See Schene, supra note 13, at 4-6.
Thus, although critics may contend that the state cannot distinguish among the types of cases, such aprocess is already in place and being used with some success. See id. at 4-5 (describing a Minnesota
study on the benefits of differential response).
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1. More Protection in Practice
As described in Part II, the rights-based model, as implemented, fails to
protect parents and children in three important ways: It does not safeguard
against racial and politically driven decisionmaking; it does not offer
procedures and court adjudications that lead to considered, careful decisions;
and it requires state intervention that often comes at a high cost to the well-
being of children. The problem-solving model-and here I refer to the
specific process of family group conferencing-is greatly superior to the
rights-based model with respect to these three practical concerns.
First, family group conferencing protects the interests of parents and
children in unnecessary removals because it better guards against racial bias and
politically motivated decisionmaking. Implicit in the decision to remove a
child and ultimately terminate parental rights is a cultural judgment by those
with the authority to decide the child's future--child protective services and
the family court. In family group conferencing, these decisions are made by
(more) culturally sensitive actors.244  If family members and community
representatives assess a family's well-being, that assessment likely will come less
laden with the racial, class, and cultural biases- of the predominantly white and
middle class child welfare system.245 And because decisionmakers are not
agency officials, there will not be the same tendency to overreach in the after-
math of well-publicized abuse and neglect cases. To be sure, child protective
services could initiate more investigations in the wake of well-publicized cases,
but the family group conference would decide for itself if removal was neces-
sary, thus acting as an important check on the agency.
244. See Marian S. Harris & Ada Skyles, Working With African American Children and
Families in the Child Welfare System, in RACE, CULTURE, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW 98-99 (Kimberly
Holt Barrett & William H. George eds., 2005) (calling for greater cultural competence among
child welfare professionals working with African American families in the child welfare system).
Of course family group conference participants would have their own biases and cultural values,
but at least these biases would be more endogenous than those of social workers and judges who
are not part of the community. Moreover, the decisions of the family group conference will be
more contextualized because the participants actually know the family.
245. In the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), Congress recognized these cultural
judgments and, fearing the ramifications of such judgments-the removal of children from Indian
homes and their placement in non-Indian families-devised a statutory scheme that more heavily
favors parental rights by permitting the removal of an Indian child only upon a showing of "clear
and convincing evidence," ICWA, Pub. L. No. 95-608, § 102(e), 92 Stat. 3071 (1978) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e) (2000)), and the termination of parental rights only upon a showing of
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt "that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." Id. § 102(0
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (Supp. 2002)). These standards are much higher than those used
for non-Indian child welfare cases. See supra note 30.
Rights Myopia in Child Welfare
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Second, family group conferencing is not dependent on adequate
counsel or a court with sufficient time and resources to determine a
beneficial outcome. Rather, in family group conferencing, the participants
can deliberate at their own pace. It also accounts for the multifaceted
human problems that may not lend themselves to court-determined
solutions.246 In family group conferencing, professionals do not provide a
solution, rather, the individuals involved in the problem devise the solution.
One advocate of family group conferencing describes the theory as follows:
The relationships between all the parties, and out of which the
problems have arisen, are so numerous and ever-changing, and so
interconnected that it is folly to believe that outsiders to those
relationships could ever "know" them in a way that permits either
accurate prediction or predictable intervention. The only ones who
might have a chance at that are the parties themselves. For that
reason it is they who must pool their perceptions of the relationships,
of the problems arising within them, then search together for ways in
which each of them, according to their own skills and inclinations, can
make different and better contributions.242
It is precisely this personal expertise that is lost in the current system.
Third, the safety of children is better protected through family group
conferencing because it leads to fewer removals and more placements with
family members, while still ensuring that children are not abused or neglected.
In the ideal model of family group conferencing the conference occurs before
removal, thus the risk of damaging the bond between parent and child
by preemptive removal is minimized. Children are not removed until the
family group conference determines that is the proper course of action.
Certainly difficult cases exist, such as substance abuse, where drug treatment
can take years and relapse is highly likely.2 48  However, if the family group
conference is able to devise a solution that both ensures the parent will obtain
treatment and the child will be protected, perhaps by placing the child with a
close relative, then a conflict between parent and child does not necessarily
246. See Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to
Transform the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. Cr. REV. 203, 203 (2004) ("[T]he adversarial, rights-based model typically fails to serve the interests of children and families and may be more harmful
than beneficial to children relative to other possible methods of dispute resolution."); John E.B.
Myers, Children's Rights in the Context of Welfare, Dependency, and the Juvenile Court, 8 U.C. DAVISJ. Juv. L. & POL'Y 267, 281 (2004) (arguing that family courts are unable to solve "complex
human problems" through an adversarial process).
247. Ross, supra note 198, at 13.
248. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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exist. Continued contact between parent and child during treatment will
maintain the bond, but the child's needs will still be met in the alternative home.
Finally, family group conferencing has additional practical benefits.
For example, it gives greater voice to extended family and community
members in the decisionmaking process. The current legal framework does
not account for the reality of children's lives, in which many individuals
beyond parents may play important roles. If we continue to adhere to the
parents' rights and children's rights model, then it becomes necessary to
determine who can assert parental rights, and important to limit that right
to a defined set of individuals. Family group conferencing, by contrast,
allows multiple adults to participate in decisionmaking relevant to the
child's life, accounting for what is in fact a broader range of individuals with
a stake in the child.249 Thus a child's relationships with these individuals
will be accounted for in the decision without the necessity of assigning
parental rights to a limited group or abrogating those rights in favor of
alternative adults. Likewise, a strength of family group conferencing is that
it acknowledges the importance of a child's connection to her community
and reinforces those community ties. As noted above, these connections
may make the difference in the life of an at-risk child.25°
2. A More Apt Theoretical Framework
My two central theoretical concerns with a rights-based model-that it
privileges autonomy while undervaluing assistance, thus failing to account for
the important role of poverty in child abuse and neglect, and that it generates
adversarial processes and relationships-are also better addressed in a
problem-solving model.
First, the problem-solving model is a more apt framework for
implementing Jennifer Nedelsky's model of rights, in which the relevant
question is how to structure rights such that they foster desirable
relationships. In this new model, rather than asserting a right of autonomy
from the state, the parent asserts a claim for assistance from the state.
2 This
249. See Buss, supra note 40, at 29 (noting that the classic frame of parent versus state "oversimplifies
the field of potential competitors considerably," notably excluding extended family members).
250. See supra note 227 (discussing the Kauai study).
251. Of course this is a complex issue. I do not, here, frame this as a right to assistance,
largely because the U.S. legal system, at least constitutionally speaking, generally does not confer
positive rights-our liberty is negative. Although my preference would be for a legally enforceable
right to assistance from the state, because I think this so unlikely to happen, I state the right here
as a "claim," thus diluting its power but also giving it a greater chance for recognition. I intend to
explore this issue more fully in a subsequent article. In addition to the legal question of whether
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dependency on the state is intended to foster true autonomy for the
parent-ultimately the ability to care for a child without state support.
This assistive approach of the problem-solving model252 is more protective
than the rights-based model because offering meaningful assistance to
parents, such as job training, drug treatment, or subsidized housing, does far
more to vindicate the rights recognized by the Supreme Court than a five-
minute court hearing with poor counsel after children already have been
removed from the home.253 Moreover, parents are invested in the solution
because they chose it themselves. Indeed all conference participants have
this "buy-in," which would not happen to the same degree if the solution
was imposed by the state, either through a social worker or the court.
This recognition of the need for assistance, not simply autonomy,
better acknowledges the role of poverty and creates a more accurate frame
for the issues facing families in the child welfare system.254 This frame will, in
turn, reorient the substance of the child welfare system. As opposed to inter-
vening to "rescue" a child and offering minimal, and often ineffective, services
to the parent, the process of family group conferencing is a means for
families to articulate what supports they need to function better, and an
opportunity for the child welfare system, extended families, and the
community to provide those supports. Although the risk factors for abuse
and neglect are complex, they are not unknown, and can be addressed.
the parent has a right to receive support from the state, there are a host of practical questions.
How much can the parent claim from the state? Should the state set a dollar limit on what it owesthe parent? What if the state refuses to provide the requested supports, perhaps because of anindependent determination that such supports will not help the family? Rather than explore
these issues at length here, I only note that these are the right questions to be asking.252. I am aware of the potential for increased state control of poor families in such a model,
see, e.g., Appell, supra note 43, at 765-69 (describing the importance of rights to poor families to prevent
the state imposing its own view of acceptable parenting and family forms); Katherine M. Franke,Taking Care, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2001) (noting that the "delicate act oftranslation-from private need to public obligation-demands acute sensitivity to the ways in whichpublic responsibility inaugurates a new and complex encounter with a broad array of publicpreferences that deprive dependent subjects of primary stewardship over the ways in which their
needs are met"). I intend to explore this issue more fully in a subsequent article.253. See LINDSEY, supra note 111, at 318-19 (proposing "two simple programs" to end childpoverty: a child allowance from the government to raise children and effective child supportprograms, combined with universal child care); ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 268 (arguing for
addressing family poverty by increasing the minimum wage, creating jobs, establishing nationalhealth insurance, providing high-quality subsidized child care, and increasing the supply of
affordable housing). In this Article I emphasize the role of the state in assisting families, but one
of the benefits of family group conferencing is that it identifies the hidden resources of families
and communities.
254. Family group conferencing is still relevant and beneficial for economically stablefamilies. For example, the process provides them with greater decisionmaking authority than in a
court-centric system.
HeinOnline  -- 53 UCLA L. Rev. 692 2005-2006
Rights Myopia in Child Welfare 693
Changing the frame for the child welfare case could help reorient
society's views of abuse and neglect away from the view that abuse and
neglect are products of parental pathology, and toward a view of social
responsibility, where a broader group-both the immediate community and
the state-claims responsibility for the larger circumstances that led to the
abuse or neglect.255 Noted child welfare researcher Duncan Lindsey has
described the "residual" nature of the child welfare system as one where the
system intervenes in the lives of a subset of low-income families, those who
experience, or are at great risk for, abuse and neglect, rather than
intervening and offering services to all families who suffer from poverty.
256
In this way, the child welfare system views abused and neglected children
apart from the society that helped create their circumstances." Family
group conferencing can help bridge this divide. It is not a radical reorder-
ing of our social system to redistribute wealth, but rather one step toward
greater social responsibility for responding to the environment that led to
the abuse or neglect.
Family group conferencing itself will not solve poverty. To the extent
the needed services, such as subsidized housing, job training, or effective
treatment for substance abuse problems, are not provided or available,
family group conferencing will have limited utility. Thus, a ready criticism
of family group conferencing is that even if it does focus the system on
poverty, the resources to address the underlying issues may be unavailable.
There are two answers to this criticism. The family group conference
would at least identify the real problem, instead of, for example, a
255. See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 39, at 181-85 (discussing the origins of child protection as
part of an attempt to address child poverty, but describing political changes in the twentieth century,
particularly the 1970s, that led away from framing child abuse as a product of greater social ills).
256. See LINDSEY, supra note 111, at 18. This is not true for child sexual abuse, which spans
all classes. See supra note 19. Annette Appell argues that this view of child abuse is part of a
larger discourse that locates responsibility for poverty and its related problems in the individual,
rather than society. See Annette R. Appell, Disposable Mothers, Deployable Children, 9 MICH. J. RACE
&L. 421, 421 (2004). Appell writes:
The dominant discourse about poverty and racism has changed significantly in the past
decade to reflect a view that poverty, problems attendant to poverty, and racial
affiliation are matters of individual choice that have individualized solutions. In this
discourse, poverty, homelessness, child neglect, and economically blighted and isolated
communities reflect personal pathology; White supremacy is a relic and all race
distinctions are bad. These beliefs are manifested in federal legislation that limits welfare
benefits, promotes adoption of poor children, and removes barriers to transracial
adoption. A common denominator of this legislation is the notion that poor (Black)
families are pathological so they should be discouraged from having children and the
children that they do have would be better off with other parents.
Id.
257. See LINDSEY, supra note 111, at 2 n.1.
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caseworker removing a child for inadequate housing and referring the parent
for parenting classes. In the family group conference, all would agree that the
family needs help with housing. This focus would be a sea change from the
current system, which typically does not meaningfully address the under-
lying causes of abuse or neglect.
Additionally, highlighting the real needs of the families involved in
the child welfare system may require society to acknowledge these needs
and thus reorder our social policies. This orientation is a far cry from the
current trend of limiting benefits to low-income families, but this
reorientation would at least force an honest public debate about whether
society indeed wants to help reduce child abuse and neglect. In other
words, if the question is whether the state should provide economic benefits
to parents who abuse or neglect their children, the answer likely is no. But
if the question is whether society wants less child abuse and neglect, the
answer likely is yes. If reducing child abuse and neglect requires providing
parents with adequate economic support, such as subsidized housing and
child care, then society may view the provision of such supports more
openly.25s Moreover, if the political will is there, and if family group
conferencing delivers on the promise of fewer out-of-home placements,
then some of the $22 billion currently spent on the child welfare system 59
could be redirected toward direct economic support for poor families, such
as subsidized child care.
Second, family group conferencing facilitates a collaborative, not
adversarial, relationship between parents and the state. The state is helping a
parent resolve the underlying issues leading to the abuse or neglect, rather than
trying to establish parental unfitness. In other words, the starting point is the
assumption that the interests of the state, parents, and children are aligned:
All would benefit from helping the parents overcome the issues facing them
and be better able to parent.26° This will further support the move in the child
258. It could also be argued that the costs of the child welfare system far outweigh the costs
of providing economic supports to families. See supra text accompanying notes 228-231.Moreover, in the long-term, the costs associated with the poor outcomes for children in foster
care-increased involvement in the criminal justice system, lower rates of employment, higher
rates of teen pregnancy-also argue in favor of investing sooner rather than later. Cf. ClareHuntington, Welfare Reform and Child Care: A Proposal for State Legislation, 6 CORNELL J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 95, 110-11 (1996) (addressing the costs associated with not investing in child care).
259. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
260. There will be cases where a party engages in strategic behavior or acts deceptively, or theinterests of the parties do conflict. I do not mean to gloss over these realities of human behavior.Rather, I intend to highlight the orientation of a problem-solving model: The model assumes it is atleast possible that the parties can work together toward a mutually beneficial outcome.
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welfare field among social workers to recognize the strengths of bio-
logical families and to try and work with them to preserve families. 6 '
The problem-solving model as embodied in family group conferencing
also fosters better relationships between parents and children because it is a
legal framework that draws on the widely-respected "family systems" theory,
which posits that the most effective intervention for a child occurs when
the whole family is treated.262 Family group conferencing does not isolate
the child from the parent and determine whose interests should prevail, but
rather assumes that the family, who played a role in the problem, can also
play a role in a solution. Susan Brooks describes the five attributes of a legal
framework that would reflect family systems theory: (1) identifying the members
of the family system, (2) considering the mutual interests of all the
members, (3) maintaining family ties and continuity, (4) emphasizing the
present and future, rather than past misdeeds, and (5) focusing on a family's
strengths.263 Family group conferencing fits this bill. Instead of interrupting
the important bond between parent and child, family group conferencing
reinforces that bond, while still acknowledging that something has gone
awry between parent and child. Children need a process that ensures their
safety while simultaneously recognizing the complexity of family problems,
the importance of original families, and the need for assistance to address
underlying social and economic issues.
261. See Schene, supra note 13, at 6. New York City has made this change on a policy level,
reducing by half the number of children in foster care, and statistics appear to support the
conclusion that this shift has not compromised the safety of those children not placed in foster
care. See Fernanda Santos, Placements in Foster Care Are at Lowest Since Mid-80's, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2005, at A33. City officials attribute the reduction to a strong economy, a decline in the
use of crack cocaine, and an explicit policy adopted by the Administration for Children's Services
(ACS) that strives to keep children in their own families. See id. The city offers substantial
supports to parents, such as counseling, housing aid, and substance abuse treatment. See id. A
policy emphasizing preservation is always vulnerable, however, as evidenced by the debate
following a recent death of a child returned to his mother by the ACS. See Leslie Kaufman,
Mother of Boy Who Died Was Trained, Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at B3; Leslie
Kaufman, Baby Drowned as Mother Listened to CD's, Prosecutor Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at
B1. Of course this shift is not complete around the country. For example, in Alabama, it took a consent
decree to get social workers to start working with biological families, rather than simply to dismiss
such families as dysfunctional. See supra note 199. Certainly the current legal framework, as
embodied in the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), does not facilitate this social work
approach. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62 (describing ASFA).
262. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (discussing the family systems theory).
263. See Brooks, supra note 176, at 14-20.
264. This filtering and reorientation would transform the scholarly debate. Part of the
problem with the debate is that it is located in an overly broad context. The narrative of a
severely abused or neglected child drives the legal theory of many scholars who advocate for state
intervention. For example, in her call for prompt removal of children and termination of parental
rights, Elizabeth Bartholet does not distinguish among the types of cases in the child welfare
Rights Myopia in Child Welfare
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B. Overcoming the Inertia of Rights
A move by a state away from the rights-based model and toward the
problem-solving model likely would encounter some resistance. To discuss
this issue, this subpart again uses family group conferencing as an example
of a process that satisfies the problem-solving model. While some pilot
programs are underway in the United States, if states were to adopt family
group conferencing more comprehensively, for example by mandating its
use on a statewide level, states could expect considerable opposition from
judges, lawyers,26 and advocates for both parents and children. Many will
protest that a move away from a rights-based orientation will not
sufficiently protect parents and children. This section briefly explores this
issue, suggesting responses to some anticipated arguments against family
group conferencing.
First, lawyers and advocates for parents may argue that parents should
not relinquish constitutionally protected rights to the care and custody of
their children. However, this right is not absent in family group
conferencing. In the problem-solving model embodied in family group
conferencing, the right of a parent to the care and custody of her child is
still in effect. Indeed, the parent who participates in the conference
bargains in the shadow of this legal principle. But the process for protecting
system and instead uses extreme cases as illustrations of the need for greater protection of
children. See BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 67, 115-16. But surely such advocates do not mean to
extend the proposal for expedited removal and termination of parental rights to all cases in the
child welfare system. Thus narrowed, the debate may find greater common ground than expected.
In the cases of severe abuse and neglect, advocates of family preservation may be more likely to
concede the primacy of children's interests. Indeed, Dorothy Roberts makes this point. See
ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 225. ("I do not argue that Black children who are abused and neglected
should never be removed from their parents. Surely Black children deserve the same protection
from injury as others."). Conversely, if such children are identified and protected by the state,
children's rights advocates may be more willing to concede there is less need to intervene
aggressively in poverty-related neglect cases (50 percent of all cases). By changing the filter
device on the child welfare system, the two sides may seem closer together. Perhaps the dispute is
about the appropriate approach to the approximately 40 percent of cases that involve less serious
abuse and neglect, but not simple poverty-related neglect. Finally, family group conferencing is also
a means for implementing some of the alternative proposals offered to the dichotomous world of
parents' rights and children's rights. For example, family group conferencing could give effect to
the fiduciary model proposed by Elizabeth Scott and Robert Scott. See supra notes 91-96 and
accompanying text. They "seek to discover the means through which a scheme of legal regulation
can best motivate parents to invest the effort necessary to fulfill the obligations of child-rearing."
Scott & Scott, supra note 91, at 2416. Scott and Scott conclude that the current child welfare
laws do not sufficiently motivate parents. A family group conference may be a better method for
motivating parents if indeed there are sufficient support services available to the parents.
265. It is not an insignificant issue that family group conferencing anticipates a far smaller
role for lawyers. For this reason alone, there is certain to be an outcry against the process.
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it is less focused on the rhetoric of rights, and involves fewer procedural
rights. The point here is not that rights completely disappear, but rather
that they recede in importance and are replaced with a new process that is
less rights-centric, and, as a result, less adversarial.
In this way, family group conferencing is not susceptible to
constitutional challenge. For example, an aggrieved parent whose child was
removed against her will after a conference could claim that her
constitutional right to the care and custody of her child was violated by this
process.16 ' But the procedures used in a family group conference would not
violate the Constitution: Parents' liberty interest in the care and custody of
a child is still cognizable, and the new procedures to protect that interest-
procedures of family group conferencing-are both adequate safeguards and, even
more importantly, not the sole recourse for a parent. Indeed, as noted
above, a parent can veto the conference plan and choose to go to court.267
The ability to veto and proceed to court means that, constitutionally
speaking, the family group conference is akin to a new level of
administrative review. It could be argued that the availability of court
review undermines the effectiveness of family group conferencing because it
colors a parent's willingness to engage fully in the process and leads to
parental holdouts. In practice, however, in countries and states where family
group conferencing has been implemented, 95 percent of cases are resolved in
the family group conference and do not entail court involvement."' Indeed,
the small number of cases that need to be resolved by the court is strong
evidence that parents understand they are likely to have greater say and a
better outcome through the conference than in court.
Second, lawyers and advocates for children (at least those in the
protectionist strain) may argue that children will not be sufficiently
protected in the family group conference, in part because child advocates,
such as guardians ad litem, are not clearly involved in the process. By
contrast, family group conferencing relies on the parents, extended family
members, and community representatives to advocate for the interests of
the child. Elizabeth Bartholet has argued against the use of family group
266. As a practical matter, the more likely scenario is that the parent would not agree to the
plan and thus the family group conference would "fail," and would be referred to family court.
267. As discussed in Part Ii, if a parent does not agree to the plan, then the case is referred
to court. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
268. See Lisa Merkel-Holguin et al., Learning With Families: A Synopsis of FGDM Research
and Evaluation in Child Welfare, PROTECTING CHILDREN: FGDM RESEARCH AND EVALUATION
(Am. Humane Ass'n, Denver, CO), 2003, at 2, 2-11. I recognize the possibility of coercion in
this statistic. But research shows a very high satisfaction rate for participants in family group
conferences. See Sundell & Vinnerljung, supra note 212, at 276.
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conferencing precisely for this reason. She contends that the process "is
about giving parents accused of maltreatment, together with other adult
family members, even greater power than they now have over the fate of
their children. It is about limiting the state's power to intervene to protect
these children, and limiting the larger community's sense of responsibility
for them." '269 To me, the question is whether family group conferencing is
oriented toward ensuring that multiple adults take responsibility for the
child, or whether it is an endeavor that encourages adults to simply argue
for a piece of the child. By all accounts, family group conferencing achieves
the former result. Moreover, the bulk of the research indicates that children
are protected by the process."' State monitoring and follow-up can also
protect children, as will family group conference members who have
committed themselves to ensuring the safety of the child. Indeed, individuals
who are involved in the day-to-day life of a child, and are empowered by the
family group conference, are far better positioned to protect a child than an
overburdened caseworker who visits the home infrequently."2 '
Finally, some may argue that family group conferencing runs counter to
American cultural values of individualism.272 This may be true. But it is also true
that if we want to address child abuse and neglect, we need to reconceive of
society's responsibility for such abuse and neglect-both our role in creating the
problem and in solving it. The focus on individual pathology, rather than
societal choices, has resulted in limited imagination regarding how best to address
abuse and neglect. Moreover, by providing a formal, but nonadversarial forum
for problem-solving, family group conferencing provides a productive and safe
context in which parents can take ownership and responsibility for their
shortcomings as parents. It also provides a process for the state to rectify its
269. BARTHOLET, supra note 7, at 146.
270. See supra notes 212-213 and accompanying text.
271. I do not mean to speak poorly of caseworkers. Many are highly committed, engaged
professionals. Rather, my concern stems from the high caseload and limited training of
caseworkers. For example in Texas, a study showed that caseworkers, often recent college
graduates, had an average of twenty-one cases, with many handling thirty-five to forty cases. See
CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN: A SPECIAL REPORT ON THE TEXAS
FOSTER CARE SYSTEM 148 (2004). The Child Welfare League of America recommends a
caseload ratio of twelve to fifteen cases per caseworker. See CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AM.,
CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA'S STANDARDS OF EXCELLENCE FOR FAMILY FOSTER
CARE SERVICES (1995).
272. It could be argued that family group conferencing works in small, closely knit
communities, but not large cities where social isolation may have played a role in the abuse and
neglect in the first place. Advocates of family group conferencing contend that there is always a
community to be found and that the process itself both creates and reinforces bonds between the
family and the community.
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failure to support the family earlier. In this way, family group conferencing is
one step towards expanding responsibility for child abuse and neglect.27
I do not mean to dismiss important questions and concerns about family
group conferencing.274 I am not arguing that family group conferencing resolves
all the problems in the child welfare system, but rather that a problem-solving
model is far more promising than a solely rights-based model. Indeed, once we
move beyond the myopia of rights, it could be that we discover even more
effective processes. But this first step is crucial.
CONCLUSION
The child welfare system is caught in the trap of ever greater emphasis
on competing rights, at the expense of the very parents and children who
are meant to be helped by the system. No amount of more careful
calibration of those rights will solve the problems facing families in the
child welfare system. We need to shift our focus away from rights and
toward problems. A problem-solving model, as embodied in family group
conferencing, is far more effective at protecting the interests at stake, for
both parents and children. Family group conferencing has been shown to
decrease abuse and neglect, preserve families, and bring communities
together. Parents and children in the system deserve more than the empty
promises of rights. A problem-solving model can deliver what a solely
rights-based system never will.
273. I also note, however, that it could be seen as a means to privatize the problems of the
family. I intend to explore this balance between state involvement and parental autonomy in a
subsequent article.
274. Additional research is needed in several areas. For example, it should be determined
whether family group conferencing is effective for socially isolated parents who may not have an
existing network that could both help the parents and provide the extralegal enforcement
contemplated by family group conferencing. I explore several such issues in a forthcoming
publication. See Clare Huntington, Family Group Conferencing in the United States: Questions for
the Future, in FAMILY LAW: BALANCING INTERESTS AND PURSUING PRIORITIES (forthcoming).
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